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Six years ago, I explained in these pages Why the President (Almost)
Alvays Wins in Foreign Affairs.' That article identified the recurrent patterns
of executive activism, congressional passivity, and judicial tolerance that push
Presidents successfully to press the limits of law in foreign affairs. Four years
later, in Transnational Public Law Litigation,2 I applauded the turn by private
litigants to United States courts to promote the observance of international
human rights norms by foreign and United States government officials. In the
Haitian refugee litigation, the theses of these two articles collided, yet both,
ironically, came true.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council3 (HCC), transnational public law
litigants sued United States officials for violating internationally recognized
human rights standards, won the release of more than three hundred refugees
held unlawfully at the U.S. naval base in Guantfnamo, Cuba, and established
important public law precedents. Yet in the end, the predicted result occurred:
the President took drastic action in response to a perceived foreign policy
crisis, Congress stood silent, and the Supreme Court condoned the result by
making bad law regarding treaties, refugees, and foreign affairs.
While litigating Haitian Centers Council, I came to realize that by
focusing on these two interlocking paradigms, I had overlooked a third: what
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1. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ. 1255 (1988) [hereinafter Why the President Wins]. I later expanded upon
that article in HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUIION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
2. 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) [hereinafter TPLL].
3. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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I now call the "Haiti Paradigm" in United States human rights policy.
Understanding why human rights activists sue and why Presidents successfully
defend does not explain why administrations make bad human rights policy.
Nearly three years after the military coup that overthrew the first
democratically elected government of Haiti, our policy toward that country
stands perilously close to upside-down: inordinately soft on the illegitimate
regime, while unfairly harsh on fleeing refugees. How could this happen?
What led an administration ostensibly committed to a foreign policy of
democracy and human rights to respond to an unfolding crisis with policies
that have accomplished neither result?
This Essay looks back on the Haitian crisis through the lens of the Haitian
Centers Council litigation. It explains why the litigants sued and what they
accomplished. It analyzes why Congress desisted, the Supreme Court erred,
and the President prevailed. Finally, it assesses why a policy foundered.
In my view, a failure of recognition and resolve led two successive
administrations to address the problems of democracy and human rights in
Haiti with good intentions and bad results. I conclude by suggesting that the
United States government failed to recognize and avoid the policy pitfalls the
Haiti Paradigm revealed. As we move toward the next century, we should
remember the Haiti fiasco of the early 1990's not as an isolated moment of
broken campaign promises or realpolitik. We should regard it instead as a
cautionary tale, a source of basic lessons that should guide United States
human rights policy to better results in other troubled spots in the New World
Disorder.
I. THE HAITI STORY
The Haitian refugee story has been told in many places,4 and can be
quickly recounted here. In September 1981, the Governments of the United
States and Haiti entered a unique bilateral agreement "for the establishment of
a cooperative program of interdiction and selective return to Haiti of certain
Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons coming
from Haiti. ' 5 Pursuant to that agreement and the executive order implementing
it,6 the Coast Guard began "interdicting" fleeing Haitians on the high seas and
4. For just a sampling, see Victoria Clawson, Elizabeth Detweiler, & Laura Ho, Litigating as Law
Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council, 103 YALE LJ. 2337 (1994) [hereinafter Litigating
as Law Students]; The Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Aliens and the Duty of
Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 6 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh,
Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
Reflections]; Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L
L. 483 (1993).
5. Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559 [hereinafter
1981 U.S.-Haiti Agreement] (emphasis added).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
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summarily interviewing, or "screening" them, bringing to the United States
only those few "screened-in" Haitians found to have "credible fears" of
political persecution.
To the extent that the interdiction program tolerated the return of de facto
political refugees, it appeared to violate the "nonrefoulement" requirement of
Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.7 That provision mandated that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel
or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his...
political opinion."s Various contemporaneous government documents and
instruments implementing the interdiction program confirmed that this
obligation applied on the high seas.9 Nevertheless, an early judicial challenge
to the interdiction program foundered for lack of standing, leaving the program
in place for more than a decade. 0
In 1990, in a United Nations-monitored election, more than 67% of the
voters elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide President of the first freely elected
democratic government of Haiti. After a brief and troubled presidency, Aristide
was overthrown by military coup in September 1991. Initially, top officials of
the Bush administration declared, "This is a time for collective action.""
Pursuant to the Santiago Commitment to Democracy, 12 the Organization of
7. 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, done July 28, 1951. The United States became a party to the
Refugee Convention when it acceded to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. For a critique of the Haitian interdiction program, see
Stephen H. Legomsky, The Haitian Interdiction Programme, Human Rights and the Role of Judicial
Protection, INT'L J. REFUGEE L., Special Issue, Sept. 1990, at 181.
8. 19 U.S.T. at 6276 (emphasis added).
9. President Reagan effectively acknowledged that the nonrefoulement obligations of Article 33 applied
to interdicted Haitians when he issued Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,110. In order to ensure
"the strict observance of our international obligations concerning those who genuinely flee persecution in
their homeland," id., that order guaranteed "that no person who is a refugee will be returned without his
consent," id. at 48,109. INS Guidelines issued to implement the 1981 Executive Order further mandated
that INS personnel "be constantly watchful for any indication (including bare claims) that a person or
persons on board the interdicted vessel may qualify as refugees under the United Nations Convention and
Protocol." IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, INS ROLE IN AND GUIDELINEs FOR INTERDICTION
AT SEA (Oct. 6, 1981) (emphasis added), quoted in Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501-02
(11th Cir. 1992). Finally, two opinions from the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel reaffirmed
the point. See Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242, 248 (1981)
(reasoning that interdicted Haitians "who claim that they will be persecuted ... must be given an
opportunity to substantiate their claims"); Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Off. Legal Counsel, to the Associate Att'y Gen. (Aug. 5, 1981) ('Those who claim to be refugees must be
given a chance to substantiate their claims [under Article 33]."), quoted in Joint Appendix at 222, Haitian
Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, No. 92-344 (1993).
10. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11. Statement of Secretary of State James Baker, OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, OEA/Ser.FN.1,
MRE/ACTA 1/91, Oct. 2, 1991, at 17; see also id. ("[1It is imperative that we agree-for the sake of
Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy throughout the hemisphere--to act collectively to defend
the legitimate government of President Aristide.").
12. Resolution on Representative Democracy, OAS AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91) (calling for an
automatic meeting of the OAS Permanent Council "in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the
sudden or irregular interruption of ... the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected
government in any of the Organization's member states").
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American States (OAS) adopted sanctions programs and issued resolutions
urging the restoration of constitutional government in Haiti. 3
But as boatloads of refugees began fleeing Haiti in unprecedented
numbers, the Bush administration's mood changed. Instead of bringing
screened-in Haitians to the United States, the Coast Guard began taking them
to the U.S. Naval Base in GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba, and detaining them in
makeshift military camps behind razor-barbed wire without due process rights
of any kind. In November 1991, the Haitian Refugee Center (HRC) sued
Secretary of State Baker and other government officials in the Southern
District of Florida, challenging, inter alia, the practice of returning screened-out
Haitians based upon insufficient process. Despite HRC's initial district court
successes, the Eleventh Circuit twice ruled against it. 4 HRC's suit ended in
February 1992, when the Supreme Court denied HRC's petition for certiorari,
with only Justice Blackmun dissenting.1
5
At that point, some 3000 Haitians were being held incommunicado at
Guantdnamo. Virtually all had been found to have credible fears of political
persecution. In March 1992, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
determined to reinterview the Haitians held there-without lawyers
present-and to send those who failed the test of political asylum back to Haiti
to face possible persecution and death.' 6
At that point, Michael Ratner (of the Center for Constitutional Rights) and
I were co-teaching the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights
Clinic, a clinical course at the Yale Law School that we had taught for several
years.'7 Initially we had brought "international tort suits"--including one
against the former dictator of Haiti-seeking civil damages against an array of
13. OAS MRE/RES. 1/91, Doc. OEA/Ser.F/V.1 (Oct. 3, 1991) (demanding "full restoration of the rule
of law and of the constitutional regime" and the immediate reinstatement of Aristide, recommending action
to bring about the diplomatic isolation of the junta, and urging all OAS states to suspend nonhumanitarian
economic financial and commercial ties with Haiti); OAS MRE/RES. 2/91 (Oct. 8, 1991) (condemning the
decision to replace the constitutional president of Haiti); OAS MREIRES. 3/92 (May 17, 1992) (asking
OAS members to deny port access to vessels violating the embargo and to freeze the assets of coup
supporters); OAS CF/RES. 594 (923192) (Nov. 10, 1992) (urging OAS member states to act through the
United Nations to strengthen representative democracy and constitutional order in Haiti).
14. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 E2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953
F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
15. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
16. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at 2353 (describing Rees Memorandum).
17. The Clinic originated, by student request, as an arm of the Allard K. Lowenstein International
Human Rights Project, a student-run organization founded at Yale Law School in 1981 to educate and
inspire law students, scholars, practicing attorneys, and policymakers in the defense of international human
rights. Both the Clinic and Project took their name from Allard Lowenstein, the political activist and Yale
Law graduate who had served as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in the Carter
administration. See generally WILLIAM H. CHAFE, NEVER STOP RUNNING: ALLARD LOWENSTEIN AND THE
STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1993). For an early account of the Clinic's work, see Thomas
Scheffey, Yale Project: Making Sure Torture Doesn't Pay, CONN. L. TRiB., Mar. 11, 1991, at 1.
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foreign government officials for human rights abuses they had committed
against their own citizens.' s
Our experience litigating these cases led to Transnational Public Law
Litigation, in which I characterized these and other lawsuits as part of an
emerging transnational analogue to the now-familiar domestic phenomenon of
"public law litigation." 9 Private litigants, I argued, are increasingly turning
to United States courts not simply to seek judicial reform of domestic
institutions, such as prisons, hospitals, and school systems, but also to enforce
internationally recognized human rights standards against foreign and U.S.
government officials. I applauded such litigation for both furthering the
protection of international human rights and returning U.S. courts to their
proper, but neglected role, as interpreters of international law. In a "new
international legal process," I argued, domestic courts would decide such cases
more frequently, reinforcing international norms, exerting political pressure,
provoking improved governmental practices, and positively affecting human
lives.2°
Given the Haitians' desperate plight, our Clinic felt obliged to test these
academic assertions in practice. Supported by able co-counsel,2 ' we filed suit
against an array of United States government officials in Brooklyn federal
court, asserting that lawyers and clients have a right to communicate with one
another before the clients are returned to political persecution. Ultimately
captioned Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,22 the suit invoked statutes, treaties,
18. In our first case, we sued the former Haitian dictator, Prosper Avril, under the Alien Tort Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), for human rights violations committed against Haitian opposition leaders. Paul
v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993). In subsequent semesters, we took similar positions against the
former Defense Minister of Guatemala, Xuncax v. Gramajo, No. 91-11564WD (D. Mass. filed June 6,
1991); Ortiz v. Gramajo, No. 91-11612WD (D. Mass. filed June 13, 1991), and an Indonesian general
responsible for the massacre at East Timor, Todd v. Panjaitan, No. 92-12255WD (D. Mass. filed Sept. 17,
1992), and submitted amicus curiae briefs in a Ninth Circuit case involving Ferdinand Marcos, Trajano v.
Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); and in several human rights cases
before the Supreme Court. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989);
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992);
Jaffe v. Snow, 610 So. 2d 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 621 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1993),
petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1993) (No. 93-241).
19. TPLL, supra note 2. That article grew, in turn, out of Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for
Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J.
169 (1987).
20. TPLL, supra note 2, at 2398-2402. A better descriptive term, I now believe, is "Transnational
Legal Process." See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe
Smith Professorship Inaugural Lecture, Yale Law School (Apr. 19, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
21. We recruited as co-counsel Joseph Tringali, Jennifer Klein, and Susan Sawyer from the New York
firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; Lucas Guttentag and Judy Rabinovitz of the ACLU Immigrants'
Rights project in New York; Robert Rubin and Ignatius Bau of the Refugee Rights Project at the San
Francisco Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights; and Suzanne Shende of the Center for Constitutional
Rights. For an account of the remarkable role of Yale Law students in the case, see Litigating as Law
Students, supra note 4.
22. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). When the case began, the lead defendant was the Bush administration's
INS Commissioner, Gene McNary; by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Clinton
administration's Acting INS Commissioner, Chris Sale, had been substituted.
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and constitutional norms, and was brought on behalf of the class of screened-in
Haitian refugees and several service organizations who sought to give the
refugees legal advice.23
In the first phase of the case (HCC-1), we won a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction requiring that the Haitians be afforded
counsel before repatriation to Haiti, rulings that the Second Circuit ultimately
upheld on appeal.24 As that appeal was pending, on Memorial Day, 1992,
President Bush abruptly changed course and issued an order from his
Kennebunkport vacation home authorizing the Coast Guard to return all fleeing
Haitians to Haiti without any process at all.25 In our view, the
"Kennebunkport Order" constituted a textbook case of refoulement, for it
effectively erected a "floating Berlin Wall" around Haiti that prevented
Haitians from fleeing anywhere, not just to the United States. Relying on
several counts in our existing complaint, we returned to court for a new TRO,
challenging the Kennebunkport Order as violating Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention; Article 33's domestic statutory analogue, § 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA);26 and the 1981 executive agreement
between the United States and Haiti. These laws, we argued, imposed on our
government a unified mandate of nonrefoulement: executive officials shall not
return political refugees with colorable asylum claims forcibly and summarily
to a country where they will face political persecution.
Reasoning that Article 33 is not self-executing, District Judge Sterling
Johnson, Jr. denied our TRO.2 7 But on expedited appeal, the Second Circuit
declared the refoulement policy illegal, finding that the new Bush policy
violated the plain language of § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (HCC-I1).28 Two days later, presidential candidate Bill Clinton praised
the Second Circuit for making the "right decision in overturning the Bush
administration's cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal
23. The organizational plaintiffs were Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a Brooklyn Haitian service
organization; New York's National Coalition for Haitian Refugees; and the Immigration Clinic of the
Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School, all public service organizations that
asserted First Amendment rights of access to the Guantdnamo Haitians for the purpose of giving them legal
counsel. Cf In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that First Amendment protects advocacy
organization's right of access to particular persons to disseminate legal advice).
24. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom.
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1992).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I) (1988) ('The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to
a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of [his] ... political opinion.").
27. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-CV1258, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992). Judge Johnson went on to say, however, "It is unconscionable that the United
States should accede to the Protocol and later claim that it is not bound by it. This court is astonished that
the United States would return Haitian refugees to the jaws of political persecution, terror, death and
uncertainty when it has contracted not to do so:' Id. at *5.
28. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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dictatorship without an asylum hearing., 29 But shortly before taking office,
President-elect Clinton abandoned that position, endorsed both Bush policies,
and prepared to defend both the summary return policy and the legality of the
GuantAnamo internment before the courts.
Meanwhile, about 300 Haitian men, women, and children remained
interned on GuantAnamo. All had credible claims of political persecution, and
many had already established full-fledged claims of political asylum.
Nevertheless, they were barred from entering the United States, because most
had the HIV virus.3" When the Guantdnamo phase of the case returned to
Brooklyn federal court for consideration of permanent relief, we amended our
complaint to challenge directly the legality of our clients' confinement in
America's first HIV concentration camp. Following a two-week trial, Judge
Johnson ordered the Guantinamo Haitians immediately released (HCC-II1).3'
The Clinton administration chose not to seek a stay of that order, and after
noticing an appeal, settled the case.32 On June 21, 1993, the government
defendants released the last of the GuantAnamo Haitians into the United States.
That same day, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court
sustained the legality of the refoulement policy, with only Justice Blackmun
dissenting.33 The Court held that neither the nonrefoulement obligations of
§ 243(h) of the INA nor Article 33 of the Refugee Convention applied to
Haitians apprehended on the high seas, thereby articulating a domestic rule of
"territorial nonrefoulement."
Less than two weeks later, President Aristide and the military coup leader
reached an agreement at Governors Island, New York, which provided for
President Aristide's return to Haiti by October 30, 1993.34 The Clinton
administration helped broker the Governors Island Accord, which provided that
Aristide would appoint a Prime Minister; that trade sanctions would be lifted
after the Prime Minister's appointment, but before President Aristide returned
to Haiti; that multinational forces would train the Haitian army and create a
29. Clinton Statement on Appeals Court Ruling on Haitian Repatriation, U.S. Newswire, July 29,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmt File. This statement echoed remarks Governor Clinton had
made only three days after the Kennebunkport Order had been issued. See Statement by Gov. Clinton on
Haitian Refugees, U.S. Newswire, May 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmt File ("I am
appalled by the decision of the Bush administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas and
forcibly return them to Haiti before considering their claim to political asylum .... This policy must not
stand."). For an extensive listing of Clinton's statements, see Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at
nn.61-63.
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (1993) (excluding from admission into the United States persons
"determined ... to have a communicable disease of public health significance").
31. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
32. The plaintiffs ultimately agreed that Judge Johnson's orders (but not his opinions) could be vacated
on the ground that defendants had fully complied with those orders, in exchange for defendants' agreement
to dismiss their appeal and to pay an award of fees and costs totalling $634,100. See Stipulated Order
Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Meissner, No. 92-1258
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1994).
33. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549.
34. Governors Island Accord, Memorandum of Agreement, July 3, 1993 (on file with author).
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new police force; that the coup leaders would take early retirement; and that
the military leaders would be granted amnesty for crimes committed while in
office. Two weeks later, the political forces and parliamentary blocs of Haiti
agreed to a separate "New York Pact," which called upon the armed forces to
respect the Governors Island agreement and to end ongoing human rights
violations.35
After brief euphoria, it became apparent that the coup leaders would not
honor the terms of the Governors Island Accord. Numerous key Aristide
supporters and cabinet ministers were murdered on the streets of Port-au-
Prince.36 In late October, the U.S.S. Harlan County, a warship carrying
lightly armed military personnel, was sent to Haiti with the stated purpose of
retraining the Haitian military. When Haitian gangs staged an anti-American
demonstration at the dock, the ship retreated. The Clinton administration then
began enforcing a multinational blockade off the coast of Haiti, alongside
Coast Guard cutters charged with intercepting and returning fleeing boat people
directly to Haiti.37 With the collapse of the Governors Island Accord, the
deadline for Aristide's return passed. Despite several efforts to revive or to
develop replacements for that accord, at this writing, Aristide's exiled
government remains in limbo, while the Clinton administration's summary
repatriation policy continues.
II. APPLIED TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
Transnational public lawsuits exhibit five distinctive features:
(1) a transnational party structure, in which states and nonstate
entities equally participate; (2) a transnational claim structure, in
which violations of domestic and international, private and public law
are all alleged in a single action; (3) a prospective focus, fixed as
much upon obtaining judicial declaration of transnational norms as
upon resolving past disputes; (4) the litigants' strategic awareness of
the transportability of those norms to other domestic and international
fora for use in judicial interpretation or political bargaining; and (5)
a subsequent process of institutional dialogue among various domestic
and international, judicial and political fora to achieve ultimate
settlement.3 8
Transnational litigants turn to United States courts to pursue an array of goals.
Litigants bring international tort cases against governmental officials-of the
35. New York Pact, Memorandum of Agreement, July 16, 1993 (on file with author).
36. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Haiti Justice Minister Slain in Defiance of U.S. Warning to Military
To Keep Peace, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1993, at Al.
37. R.W. Apple, Jr., President Orders Six U.S. Warships for Haiti Patrol, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993,
at Al.
38. TPLL, supra note 2, at 2371 (internal citations omitted).
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kind our Clinic had brought before the Haitian case-in search of
compensation, deterrence, denial of safe haven to defendants, and enunciation
of legal norms. 39  By contrast, transnational "institutional reform
litigants"--like their domestic counterparts 4 -seek these aims, but also
broader political objectives, such as the revision of governmental policies.41
In 1991, I praised transnational public law litigation as a development whose
success should be measured not by favorable judgments, but by practical
results: the norms declared, the political pressure generated, the government
practices abated, and the lives saved.
How, by these measures, did the HCC litigation fare? Perhaps law
professors should not write their own report cards. But on balance, the HCC
litigation seems to have verified both the descriptive and normative claims of
the transnational public law litigation model. As the case unfolded, HCC
developed a sprawling transnational party structure. In addition to the U.S.
government officials, Haitian aliens, and refugee service organizations who
comprised the original party set, the amici curiae supporting the plaintiffs
came to embrace a broad array of intergovernmental organizations,42
international human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), 43
domestic civil rights groups,' "rule of law" proponents, 45 refugee
advocates,4 6 and members of Congress.47 The elaborate transnational claim
39. Id. at 2349 & n.11, 2371.
40. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1979); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
41. TPLL, supra note 2, at 2371-72.
42. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344).
43. Brief of Human Rights Watch, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council
(No. 92-344); Brief of Amicus Curiae Amnesty International and Amnesty International-USA in Support
of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights in Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344); Brief of the International
Human Rights Law Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-
344).
44. Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Transafrica, and the
Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-
344); Brief of Amici Curiae American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League in Support of
Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344).
45. Brief of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344); Brief for Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Benjamin R.
Civiletti, and Griffin Bell, Former Attorneys General of the United States of America, as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344).
46. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and the Legal Action Center
of the American Immigration Law Foundation in Support of Respondent, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-
344); Brief of Amici Curiae Haitian Service Organizations, Immigration Groups and Refugee Advocates,
Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344). The only amicus brief supporting the governmental defendants was
filed by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR).
47. Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress Urging Affirmance, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-
344) [hereinafter BriefAmici Curiae Sponsors of 1980 Refugee Act]; Brief of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, Transafrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344).
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structure intertwined statutory claims, constitutional claims, and claims based
on both bilateral and multilateral agreements.4" These claims not only
interlocked but also evolved, the "lead claim" shifting as the case moved from
forum to forum.49
Like all public law litigation the suit's focus was never backward-looking,
but always prospective, evolving, and expanding. The plaintiffs began with a
relatively modest aim: securing the right to counsel for Haitians being
subjected to de facto asylum interviews on Guant~namo.5" But over time, the
narrow right-to-counsel case (HCC-1) expanded into a broad legal challenge
against most aspects of the United States government's policy toward Haitian
refugees, ranging from the extraterritorial refoulement of Haitians fleeing Haiti
(HCC-II) to the sustained offshore internment of HIV-positive Haitians on
Guantfnamo (HCC-II1).5'
From the start, the plaintiffs recognized that their chances of ultimate
success before the Supreme Court were slim.52 For that reason, their
governing strategy was to provoke the articulation of norms by sympathetic
judicial fora-the Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit-and
then to transport those norms to other fora for use in political bargaining. Once
won, the lower court victories were used to focus press attention,53 to score
points in Congress,54 to influence the Clinton campaign and transition
48. Statutory claims were brought under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act. Constitutional claims were brought under the First and Fifth Amendment Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. International claims were brought under the U.N. Refugee Convention and the
U.S.-Haiti Agreement. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at 2342-43, 2345.
49. At the initial TRO stage of HCC-I, the judge granted relief based on a statutory right to counsel
under the INA. At the preliminary injunction phase, he shifted to a due process right to counsel and the
Haitian Service Organizations' First Amendment rights. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed on due
process grounds. In HCC-II, plaintiffs initially led with Article 33 of the U.N. Refugee Convention, but
when the district judge found that provision not self-executing, they led at the Second Circuit with the
statutory nonrefoulement claim under § 243(h). In HCC-III, the district judge ruled on both statutory and
constitutional grounds. Some claims were elaborately intertwined. For example, the Haitian Service
Organizations' First Amendment claims rested on their right to inform Haitian clients about, inter alia, their
due process rights; the Haitians' liberty interest for due process purposes derived from their treaty-based
right of nonrefoulement under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. See Litigating as Law Students, supra
note 4, at 2342-50.
50. Indeed, at the start, the plaintiffs rested on the narrowest fact-specific grounds: that the Haitian
aliens had due process rights because they were (1) in custody, (2) had credible fears of persecution, and
(3) were being held on Guantdnamo, territory subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992).
51. Although the suit did not directly challenge the detention of various Haitian parolees scattered
throughout the United States, their fate often arose during settlement discussions.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
53. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at 2370-79.
54. See, e.g., U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legislation
and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1992)
[hereinafter Hearing on U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward Haiti] (testimony of Harold Hongju Koh and
Sarah Cleveland) (urging House committee to investigate abuses on Guantdnamo by citing district court
preliminary injunction opinion); U.S. Policy Toward Haitian Refugees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Operations and the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1992) [hereinafter Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Haitian Refugees]
(testimony of Harold Hongju Koh).
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teams,55 and ultimately to bargain for client interests in negotiations with the
Justice Department.
In the early phases of the suit, the plaintiffs' goal was simply to keep the
refugee issue politically alive until Bill Clinton could be elected President and
undo the Bush administration's Haitian policies.56 As in memorable domestic
public law cases involving such thorny public issues as prison reform57 and
school busing," the judicial decisions in HCC set the bounds and allocated
bargaining chips for a process of institutional dialogue among a number of fora
and players concerned with different dimensions of the larger Haitian problem.
Like other institutional reform litigants, upon winning injunctive relief from the
district court, the plaintiffs in HCC pursued a strategy of "complex
enforcement" in which court orders formed a relatively minor part of the
overall remedy.59 Most notably, the plaintiffs became de facto partners with
the district judge and government in the running of the GuantAnamo camp.
Although the government consistently denied plaintiffs' right-to-counsel claim,
arguing that the presence of counsel would disrupt the operation of the naval
base, during the last nine months of the case the defendants acquiesced in the
nearly continuous presence of plaintiffs' lawyers on Guantdnamo." Over
time, it became apparent that defendants' right-to-counsel violations stood at
the tip of the iceberg, as "[t]he desire to bring 'ongoing violation[s] to an
immediate halt' propel[led the] court inexorably to search for and eliminate
their causes. '61 Bargaining in the shadow of the district court's injunctive
orders, the plaintiffs, the INS, Justice Department officials, and various refugee
resettlement groups engaged in an ongoing dialogue that led to the piecemeal
parole of scores of refugees for health and humanitarian reasons, before final
classwide relief was judicially granted.62 In the endgame, the plaintiffs
bartered vacatur of the district court's trial orders for the freedom of the
Haitians held at Guantinamo, a governmental decision not to pursue one final
appeal, and a compensatory award of fees and costs.63
In terms of precedent and human impact, the Guant~namo phase of the
case alone vindicated the decision to bring the transnational lawsuit. On the
55. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at 2373-74.
56. Reflections, supra note 4, at 9-10.
57. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
58. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
59. See Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REv. 626
(1981) (describing judicial intervention in systemic enforcement of the Eighth Amendment).
60. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at 2375-76.
61. Note, supra note 59, at 630 ("As the causes identified reveal deeper systemic deficiencies, they
too must be addressed through increasingly expansive remedies.").
62. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at 2361-63.
63. See supra note 32. The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the precedential weight of district
court orders that have been vacated by agreement while appeal is pending. See Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in case
challenging vacatur of final judgment at parties' request when case was settled). Thus, it remains unclear
how much, if anything, plaintiffs gave away in the settlement negotiations that ultimately resolved HCC-1i.
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precedential ledger, the plaintiffs won judicial enunciation of due process
norms: both a ruling by a court of appeals (HCC-1) and a permanent injunction
from the district court (HCC-II1) declaring that aliens--even those held outside
the United States-have due process rights. These rights include decent
medical care, living conditions, and assistance of counsel in asylum hearings,
which were violated by indefinite incommunicado detention in an HIV-
internment camp.64 Most concretely, the suit won the release and parole of
some 310 Haitians held on Guantdnamo, who have now begun new lives in
America.
From the nonrefoulement portion of the case (HCC-II), a more mixed
balance sheet emerges. As Part IV below elaborates, the Supreme Court made
bad law, which has emboldened the Clinton administration to pursue a similar
policy of intercepting Chinese refugees in the Gulf of Mexico. 65 Moreover,
unlike the Guantdnamo phase, in which plaintiffs operated under favorable
district court injunctions for many months, in the nonrefoulement phase,
plaintiffs won judicial relief for only three days before the Supreme Court
stayed the Second Circuit's ruling.66 The absence of an enforceable order
drastically limited plaintiffs' capacity to use that chip to bargain for gradual
amelioration of the conditions of the summary return program while appeals
were proceeding.
Even so, the nonrefoulement challenge was almost certainly worth
bringing. Given the long history of judicial challenges to the Haitian
interdiction program, 67 it would have been anomalous not to contest the
Kennebunkport Order, the strongest U.S. assault ever against the
nonrefoulement principle. Moreover, read carefully, the precedential weight of
the Supreme Court ruling is limited. The Haitian interdiction program is
uniquely discriminatory. The Coast Guard stops Haitian boats on the high seas
solely pursuant to the 1981 United States-Haiti accord, a soon-to-be-terminated
agreement that the United States has yet to extract from any other nation.68
64. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). We also won a preliminary
injunction to the same effect, later affirmed by the Second Circuit, which was vacated by the Supreme
Court on other grounds. See McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as
moot, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
65. See Anthony DePalma, 3 Ships Adrift in a Diplomatic Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1993, at A20;
Deborah Sontag, Mexico's Position on Aliens Contradicted by Past Deeds, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at
A18.
66. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at text accompanying notes 52-53.
67. See infra note 102.
68. See 1981 U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 5. As Louis Henkin has noted, the 1981 U.S.-Haiti
Agreement along with the President's proclamation ordering interdiction
would seem to have been designed to avoid "sea-issues" of international law: the interdiction
program applies only to vessels which the United States may interdict and inspect without
violating international law, i.e., vessels flying the United States flag; vessels flying no flag; and
vessels flying the flag of Haiti, (which has agreed to the interdiction program) ....
Louis Henkin, The Constitution at Sea, 36 ME. L. REv. 201, 215 (1984) (emphasis added). On April 4,
1994, the Government of Haiti invoked the six months' termination provision of the U.S.-Haiti agreement
and notified the United States that it would terminate the agreement in October 1994. See Steven
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Nothing in the Court's decision provides general authority for the Coast Guard
to intercept and return refugees from other countries (including China) for
whom no such accord, and no Kennebunkport Order, exists.
Nor did the Supreme Court's decision in the nonrefoulement piece of the
case in any way settle the Haitian refugee crisis, which continues unabated at
this writing.69 By stanching the outflow of refugees, the Kennebunkport Order
relieved much of the political pressure on the Bush and Clinton administrations
to make good on their promise to restore democracy in Haiti. When the HRC
suit ended in early 1992, judicial oversight over the government's
administration of both the interdiction program and the GuantAnamo camp died
with it. The HCC suit won lower court declarations of illegality regarding both
policies, and during the year that appeals were pending, restored pressure on
the executive branch to deal with the underlying political crisis. During the
presidential campaign, candidate Clinton used the court decisions as part of a
broader attack on Bush's foreign policy.70 After Clinton took office and
reversed field, the betrayal of the Haitian refugees became a grassroots
political issue on which ordinary citizens took a stand.7' Had the case died
in the courts in February 1992, there would have been no similar focal point
around which such political pressure could coalesce. Furthermore, the public
outcry against the Supreme Court's decision arguably hastened the signing of
the Governors Island Accord several weeks later. After that accord failed, with
no litigation pending, no similar proposals to return Aristide have won
comparable U.S. government support.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision did not resolve the legality of the
interdiction policy under international, as opposed to domestic, law. Other
human rights groups have pressed arguments similar to those urged by the
HCC plaintiffs as a basis for challenging the U.S. government's policy before
the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and the Inter-American
Greenhouse, Aristide to End Accord That Allows U.S. to Seize Refugee Boats, N.Y. TIMS, Apr. 8, 1994,
at A6. Given that the United States arguably breached the Agreement as of May 24, 1992, see infra note
74, the government of Haiti could declare its own obligations under the agreement immediately suspended,
without waiting for six months to run. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, art. 60(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 ("A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one
of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending
its operation in whole or in part.") (emphasis added).
69. See Richard Cohen, Haiti: 2ime for Muscle, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at A27 ("If there is a
worse foreign policy botch than Haiti, nothing comes to mind.... American policy has been almost totally
discredited:'); Howard W. French, Months of Terror Bring Rising Toll of Deaths in Haiti, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
2, 1994, at Al ("Hundreds of supporters of the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide and other civilians have been
killed in Haiti in recent months in the bloodiest wave of political terror since the army overthrew Father
Aristide as President two and a half years ago.'); id. at A2 ("The disfigured body of one returnee... was
recently found near the airport, his eyes plucked out, a rope around his neck, [and] his hands tied .... ).
70. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4, at nn. 61-63 (quoting Clinton campaign statements).
71. See No More Nice Guy; Lani Guinier Nomination, THE NATION, June 28, 1993, at 891 (describing
"the legal and grass-roots campaign to free the Haitian refugees at Guantanamo").
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Commission on Human Rights.72 Nor does the Supreme Court's decision
insulate the nonrefoulement policy from other lines of attack under
international law. Absent exceptional circumstances, under both customary and
conventional international law, a state may board another state's vessel only
with the express consent and authorization of that state.73 The Bush-Clinton
program of summary return arguably works material breaches of the 1981
U.S.-Haiti interdiction agreement, which authorizes the United States to board
Haitian vessels.74 In response, President Aristide has recently given notice
that he will terminate the 1981 U.S.-Haiti Agreement by October 1994.75
Such an act would withdraw Haiti's prior consent and deprive the United
States of legal justification, under international law, for stopping, boarding,
72. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, 32 I.L.M. 1215 (1993) ("[The obligation not to return refugees to persecution
arises irrespective of whether governments are acting within or outside their borders.... UNHCR considers
the Court's decision a setback to modem international refugee law .... "). The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights is considering a petition brought by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law
challenging the Haitian interdiction program as a violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty No. 36. In March 1993, the
Commission issued an interim Resolution adopting Provisional Measures, "[c]alling upon the United States
Government to review as a matter of urgency its practice of stopping on the seas Vessels destined for the
USA with Haitians and returning them to Haiti without affording them an opportunity to establish whether
they qualify as refugees." The interim resolution noted that the U.S. policy prevents the exercise by the
Haitians of the right to seek refuge. See discussion of Case No. 10,675, in Petitioners Release Resolution
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Concerning U.S. Program of Haitian Refugee
Interdiction, 32 I.L.M. 1215 (1993). A final resolution is expected in the spring of 1994.
73. Art. 22(1) of the Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2318,450 U.N.T.S.
82, and Art. 87 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (which the
United States has accepted as customary international law, 83 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 2075, at 70-71
(1983)) guarantee all state's vessels freedom of navigation on the high seas.
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which
encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there
is reasonable ground for suspecting: (a) that ship is engaged in piracy; or (b) that the ship is
engaged in the slave trade; or (c) that, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag,
the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
Art. 22(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra (emphasis added); see also U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, art. I10, supra; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 522(2) (1986) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEiENT].
74. Article 60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, declares that "A
material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in ... a repudiation of the treaty...
[or] the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." The
stated purpose of the U.S.-Haiti Agreement was "the establishment of a cooperative program of interdiction
and selective return to Haiti of certain Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons
coming from Haiti." 1981 U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 5, at 3559 (emphasis added). The United States
Government's summary repatriation policy, as conducted since May 24, 1992, has unilaterally substituted
a program of interdiction and blanket return to Haiti of all Haitian migrants. This policy not only exceeds
the scope of Haitian consent under the 1981 agreement, but also plainly violates the object and purpose
of the agreement. Furthermore, the United States has violated its pledge that "the United States Government
does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to
qualify for refugee status," id. at 3560, and its declaration that any repatriation policy will be conducted
with "regard to ... the international obligations mandated in the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees done at New York 31 January 1967," id. at 3559.
75. See Greenhouse, supra note 68. A provision in the U.S.-Haiti Agreement authorizes the
Government of Haiti to terminate the agreement upon six months' notice for any reason whatsoever, and
a plausible argument can be made that the United States has already terminated the agreement by conduct.
See supra note 68.
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inspecting, and returning Haitian vessels to Haiti. If the U.S. policy of direct
summary repatriation were to continue, both private litigants and the
Government of Haiti could pursue available remedies against the United States
and its officials before appropriate fora.76
Those tempted to dismiss such remedies with the realist refrain,
"international law cannot be enforced," should consider the reaction of the
international community to United States v. Alvarez-Machain.77 In that case,
the Supreme Court held that a Mexican accused's forced abduction by U.S.
agents from Mexican territory, without resort to an existing bilateral extradition
treaty, did not divest U.S. courts of criminal jurisdiction to try that
defendant.78 Alvarez-Machain sparked intense media criticism and protests
from political leaders in Mexico, Canada, Europe, and the Caribbean. 79 The
decision triggered congressional hearings, 80 proposals for remedial legislation,
and an internal Justice Department review of the policy of transborder
kidnapping. 81 The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States
requested a legal opinion regarding the international legality of the Supreme
Court's decision from the Inter-American Juridical Committee, which
concluded that "the decision is contrary to the rules of international law."82
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention similarly
determined that Alvarez had been arbitrarily detained in violation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States
had just ratified.8" An exasperated district judge acquitted Alvarez-Machain
of criminal charges,84 and Alvarez thereafter filed a civil action in federal
court against the U.S. officials who had ordered his kidnapping." Finally, in
June 1993, during the North American Free Trade negotiations, Secretary of
76. See generally THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, §§ 901-907 (reviewing such remedies,
including interstate claims and remedies, dispute-resolution before international arbitral and judicial
tribunals, certain unilateral remedies, and private remedies for the violation of international law).
77. 112 S. CL 2188 (1992).
78. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that "most courts throughout the civilized world ... will be
deeply disturbed by the 'monstrous' decision the Court announces today." Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
79. See Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45
STAN. L. REV. 939, 941-42 & nn. 11-15 (1993).
80. See Kidnapping Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1992).
81. See Paul Hoffman, U.S. Must Not Kidnap Suspects Abroad, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1993, at 114
(noting legislation introduced by Senator Moynihan and internal Justice Department review ordered by
Attorney General Reno in response to decision).
82. Organization of American States, Permanent Council, Legal Opinion on the Decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 4 CRIM. L.F. 119, 124 (1993).
83. Decision No. 48/1993 (U.S.), United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at 135-40,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27 (Sept. 30, 1993). The United States finally ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976), in 1992, more than sixteen years after it entered into force. See BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 344 (1994).
84. Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20.
85. Alvarez-Machan v. United States, No. 93-4072 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
1994] 2405
HeinOnline -- 103 Yale L.J. 2405 1993-1994
The Yale Law Journal
State Warren Christopher announced that the United States and Mexico had
agreed to amend the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty to prohibit transborder
kidnapping.
86
The point is that adverse Supreme Court decisions are no longer final
stops, but only way stations, in the process of "complex enforcement" triggered
by transnational public law litigation. However unfamiliar this argument may
be to American lawyers, European civil rights litigants have long understood
that adverse national court decisions may be "appealed" to and even "reversed"
by the European Court of Human Rights.
Political realists deride the enforceability of international law, suggesting
that states "will keep their bargains so long as it is in their interest" and at no
other time.88 By this reasoning, U.S. government officials, now freed by the
Supreme Court to conduct a Haitian repatriation policy, will have no occasion
or incentive to care whether such policies comply with international law.
But such simplistic reasoning overlooks what I call the "normativity of
transnational legal process." In Louis Henkin's famous phrase, "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time. ' 89 But Henkin's description of how nations
behave leaves unanswered the crucial question: why nations behave in
accordance with international law, and particularly, what ultimately brings
nations who flout international law rules back into compliance with them.
In my view, the answer is transnational legal process. Even resisting
nations cannot insulate themselves forever from complying with international
law if they regularly participate, as all nations must, in transnational legal
interactions." Through a complex process of rational self-interest and norm
internalization-at times spurred by transnational litigation-international legal
norms seep into and become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes. In this way, international law helps drive how national governments
conduct their international relations.
86. U.S. Curbs Its Agents in Mexico, NEW HAVEN REG., June 22, 1993, at 20.
87. One striking illustration is the European Court's decision in The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser.A) (1979). In that case the British Attorney General sought and won an injunction restraining a
British newspaper from publishing a story about thalidomide children. At various stages, eight (of eleven)
English judges ruled against the newspaper, but in the end both the European Commission and the
European Court ruled in favor of the Times, requiring the British government to pay the newspaper more
than 22,000 Pounds Sterling. For a description of the Sunday Times litigation, see MARK JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 263-64 (2d ed. 1993).
88. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLrIcs AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 560
(5th ed. 1978).
89. Louis HENKiN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
90. The argument presented here, which is partially sketched at the close of TPLL, supra note 2, at
2398-2402, is more fully developed in Harold Hongju.Koh, International Law and International Relations:
The State of the Dialogue (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For a recent study of
compliance issues, see Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993).
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The Cold War realists dismissed international law as utopian and
epiphenomenal to the realities of power politics. 91 Yet in the post-Cold War
period, contemporary international relations theorists have recognized that
nations are not exclusively preoccupied with maximizing their power vis-a-vis
one another in zero-sum games. Rather, they employ cooperative strategies to
pursue more complex and multi-faceted long-run national interests, in which
compliance with negotiated norms serves as a winning strategy in a reiterated
"prisoner's dilemma" game.92  As "regime theorists" have further
elaborated, 9 institutional, governmental and private participants in a given
issue area will develop a set of governing arrangements, along with a set of
ideologies and expectations, that both restrain the participants and provide
means for achieving their common aims. Within these regimes, international
law plays a critical role both in stabilizing the expectations and in reinforcing
the restraints that regimes seek to foster.94
The picture becomes richer when one recognizes that national interests are
not givens, but rather, socially constructed products of learning, knowledge,
cultural practices, and ideology.95  Nation-states internalize norms of
international lawfulness and react to other states' reputations as law-abiding or
not.96 Legal ideologies prevail among domestic decisionmakers such that they
91. See, e.g., MORGENTHAU, supra note 88; MICHAEL J. SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO
KISSINGER (1986).
92. Game theory predicts that states, as rational, self-interested actors, will pursue a variety of
strategies to achieve both short- and long-term gains, depending on the relative costs and benefits of
competition, cooperation, or defection from a cooperative scheme. Thus, even when competition or
defection provides a short-term advantage, patterns of cooperation may nevertheless emerge from anarchy
because "the logic of collective action" convinces self-interested states that cooperation better serves their
longer-term interests. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two
Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379 (1988); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
93. A regime, as defined by political scientist Stephen Krasner, is a set of "implicit or explicit
principles, norms, roles, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in
a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982). See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
(Stephen D. Krasner ed. 1983).
94. Legal rules promote compliance with regime norms by providing channels for dispute settlement,
triggering retaliatory actions, signaling states when negative responses by other states will likely ensue, and
requiring states to furnish information that will highlight defections on their own part. For recent
scholarship espousing this "rationalistic" view of international law, see, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989);
Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985); Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in
Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L. 1 (1993).
95. See Keohane, supra note 92, at 389-92 (referring to the "cognitivist" or "reflective" models of
institutional behavior found in the work of Hayward Alker, Richard Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil, John
Ruggie, and Alex Wendt); Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms and National Security: The Japanese Police and
Military as Agents of Non-Violence 21, presented at Yale Law and Int'l Pol. Seminar, Apr. 4, 1994
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("Norms condition interests, and interests affect norms.").
96. One scholar has argued that the factor determining whether nations interact in a zone of law or
a zone of politics is whether or not the state can be characterized as "liberal." Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205
(1993). What Burley's essentialist analysis misses is that a state's identity is not exogenously given. Rather,
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are affected by perceptions that their actions are unlawful-or that domestic
opponents or other nations in the global regime will so characterize them.
Moreover, domestic decisionmaking becomes enmeshed with international legal
norms, as institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of an
international commmitment become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes.97
This reasoning predicts that in time, the United States will comply with the
norm of "extraterritorial nonrefoulement," in much the same way as it
ultimately bowed to the demand for anti-kidnapping rules in its extradition
treaty with Mexico. Law-abiding states incorporate international law into their
domestic legal and political structures. When such a state violates international
law, that violation creates frictions and contradictions that affect its ongoing
participation in the transnational legal process.98 Indeed, transnational public
law litigation of the "institutional reform" type aims precisely to provoke
judicial action that will create such frictions, thereby helping shape the
normative direction of governmental policies.
It is possible, of course, that instead of returning to compliance, the United
States will seek to promote its departure from international norms as the new
governing international rule.99 In the same way as a river that has overflowed
its banks may either recede or carve a new path, the United States government
may try to argue internationally, as it did before the U.S. Supreme Court, that
the norm of nonrefoulement does not apply extraterritorially, an idea that may
prove attractive to other developed nations that act as magnets for fleeing
refugees."° Yet such arguments, wherever made, would not settle the
question of international legality. Instead, they would simply stimulate another
round of transnational legal interaction, in which the integrity of the revised
norm could be challenged and tested by other nations and nongovernmental
actors. The process of institutional dialogue would begin again, starting
perhaps with a debate over whether to amend or reinterpret Article 33 of the
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to incorporate HCC's
notion of "territorial nonrefoulement." However this might be done, another
cycle of transnational public law litigation would almost certainly ensue before
the revised norm of "territorial nonrefoulement," now entrenched by the
participation in the transnational legal process helps constitute the identity of a state as one that obeys the
law, and hence as "liberal" or not. See Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 20.
97. See Robert 0. Keohane, Compliance with International Commitments: Politics within a Framework
of Law, in International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 86TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW (1992).
98. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 1, at 155 (noting that because the United States is party to a network
of closely interconnected treaties, unilateral executive decisions to break or bend one treaty tend to force
the U.S. into vicious cycles of treaty violation).
99. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L LJ. 457 (1985).
100. See Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German
Asylum Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503 (1993).
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Supreme Court in our domestic legal order, could "percolate up" and become
entrenched as the new governing international rule.'0 ' In short, whatever
global norm ultimately emerges, the HCC litigation marks only one episode in
what will certainly be a continuing series of transnational public lawsuits
regarding the United States' legal obligations to fleeing boat people.'02
III. WHY THE PRESIDENT WON
In The National Security Constitution, I argued that we face a continuing
dysfunction in our national security system. As Vietnam and the Iran-Contra
affair illustrated, our national security decisionmaking process has degenerated
into one that forces the President to react to perceived crises, that permits
Congress to acquiesce in and avoid accountability for important foreign policy
decisions, and that encourages the courts to condone these political decisions.
The result is a national security decisionmaking process that places too great
a burden upon the presidency, while allowing Congress and the courts too
easily to avoid constructive participation in important national security
decisions. The synergy among these institutional incentives, not the motives
of any single branch, explains the recurring pattern of executive unilateralism
in our postwar foreign policy.0 3 During the Haitian refugee crisis, all three
branches reenacted their predicted roles.
A. Why the President Acted
Presidents Bush and Clinton did not create the Haitian refugee crisis; they
merely reacted to it. Responsive action is characteristic of most Presidents,
regardless of political party.'t 4 During the Iranian hostage crisis, for example,
President Carter reacted to both international and domestic pressures by
conducting one of the most dramatic exercises of the President's peacetime
foreign affairs power in United States history.'05 During the Reagan-Bush
101. An analogous process occurred in the United States with regard to the death penalty, whereby
individual states took narrower views of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment than did the
Supreme Court, thereby prompting Supreme Court reconsideration of the Eighth Amendment rule. See, e.g.,
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
102. Indeed, the HCC case was the third in a four-part cycle of suits that began with Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987), followed by Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109
(1lth Cir. 1991); 953 F.2d 1498 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1993), and that has
continued again after HCC with suits regarding Chinese refugees. See, e.g., Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, No.
CV-93-1377-A, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 394 (E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 1994); Yang v. Maugans, No. 94-7060 (3d
Cir. argued Mar. 24, 1994).
103. Harold Hongju Koh, Reply, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 382, 385 (1990).
104. Cf. KOH, supra note 1, at 121-22 ("The same public opinion that has empowered the plebiscitary
president has simultaneously subjected him to almost irresistible pressures to act quickly in times of real
or imagined crisis .... This pattern has afflicted presidents of both political parties, without regard to
whether they have generally been viewed as weak or strong, reckless or law-abiding .....
105. Id. at 122.
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years, similar pressure led to a wave of treaty-breaking and bending.1 6
Frequent presidential use of short-term military strikes and emergency
economic powers (to respond to terrorism), longer-term military commitments
in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf (to respond to requests for peacekeeping),
arms sales (to respond to military tensions in the Middle East), and covert
actions (to effectuate neo-containment policies in Central America and Angola)
all reflected the modem American perception that crisis situations uniquely
demand a presidential response. Part and parcel of this trend was President
Bush's issuance of the Kennebunkport Order, °7 prompted at least in part by
an election-year desire to avoid a replay of the Cuban Marielito boat crisis that
had plagued the Carter presidency.'0 8
The Clinton administration's decision to perpetuate the Bush response to
the Haitian refugee crisis, made even before Clinton's Inauguration Day,
continued this pattern of executive reactivity.10 9 What puzzles, however, is
why President Clinton chose to retain Bush's policy even after painstakingly
laying the public groundwork for reversing that position.
Those who focus on Bill Clinton's "presidential character"'10 and
"leadership style""' might ascribe the change to the President's own
preferences: a retrospective desire to avoid a replay of the "Fort Chaffee
incident"-when Mariel Cubans seized an Arkansas penitentiary and doomed
Clinton's first Govemorship t 2-- and a prospective desire to avoid a refugee
inflow that might distract attention from his ambitious domestic policy agenda.
Students of Graham Allison's "governmental politics" model1 3 might explain
the shift by pointing to the truncated group that helped Clinton make the
decision-a group that reportedly included the incoming Secretary of State,
National Security Assistant and Deputy, and Secretary of Defense, but no one
from Congress, the Justice Department, or with bureaucratic responsibility for
the promotion and protection of human rights or refugees."' Lack of input
106. Id. at 43-45, 155.
107. See supra note 25.
108. JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 533-34 (1982).
109. Another recent example is President Clinton's reactive decision to bomb Baghdad in response
to the supposed assassination attempt against George Bush. See Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Bombing
Baghdad: Illegal Reprisal or Self Defense?, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 24.
110. JAMES D. BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE
HOUSE (4th ed. 1992).
111. Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Leadership Style of Bill Clinton: An Early Appraisal, 108
POL. SCI. Q. 589 (1993-94).
112. Ellen Deberport, The Cubans: A Year of Turmoil, UPI, May 7, 1981, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File; Steve Wick, Campaign '92; A Profile; Clinton: The Man, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk
ed.), Mar. 22, 1992, at 7.
113. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 144-84
(1971).
114. Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Aides Urge Freer Haiti Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at Al
(describing Clinton Haitian planning group). Indeed, press accounts reported that the Clinton administration
had closely coordinated its Haitian policy with officials of the departing Bush administration, some of
whom stayed on well into the early months of the Clinton administration specifically to handle Haiti policy.
See Steven A. Holmes, Bush and Clinton Aides Link Policies on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at A10;
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by political appointees in the Justice Department might also explain how
President Clinton could seek to reverse before the Supreme Court what he had
previously called a "right decision" by the Second Circuit, without ever
explaining why a policy he had deemed unlawful had suddenly become
lawful." 5
One explanation offered by President Clinton himself was that it was more
humanitarian to continue the forced return policy than to lift it, thereby
enticing numerous Haitians onto the high seas to drown."16 But as I discuss
more fully in Part V, this explanation does not account for the administration's
failure to adopt any of a whole series of "less restrictive alternatives" that
would have protected Haitians from drowning without forcing them back into
the arms of the Haitian military. Finally, a related explanation draws on
Allison's "rational actor" model." 7 Under this theory, whether or not the
Bush nonrefoulement policy was humanitarian, its continuation was prudent
and rational in light of American national interests, a reality that Governor
Clinton fully grasped only once he was about to become President."8 But
this claim rests on the core assertion that a rational assessment of national
interests dictated a policy of forced, summary return of refugees, a claim that
I examine and reject in Part V below.
B. Why Congress Didn't Act
What explains Congress' passivity in the face of President Clinton's policy
shift? Not only is immigration a field within the zone of Congress' plenary
authority," 9 but in the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress had specifically
amended past legislation to direct that "the Attorney General shall not return
any alien" to conditions of persecution. 20  Since 1952, Congress has
Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Rounds Out State Dept. Team, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1993, at A12; cf. IRVING
JANIS, VICTIMs OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES
(1972) (describing how "groupthink" can drive decisionmakers to exclude viable policy options).
115. when the decision to defend HCC before the Supreme Court was made, the Clinton
administration still had not found a confirmable Attorney General, and the Solicitor General-designate, my
colleague Drew S. Days III, was recused because he had signed the plaintiffs' brief. See Brief for the
Respondents, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. CL 2549 (1993), excerpts reprinted in appendix
to Reflections, supra note 4, at 21.
116. See Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Meet the Press (NBC television
broadcast, Apr. 10, 1994) (on file with author) ("President Clinton decided that the forcible return was the
more humane policy rather than permitting the people to take boats to the United States where perhaps a
third of them would have been lost in that very dangerous channel passage.").
117. ALLISON, supra note 113, at 10-38.
118. Such reasoning continues to drive the Clinton foreign policy team. See When Should We Send
in Our Troops?, USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 1994, at 13A (interview with National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake) ("The policy of return (of [Haitian] refugees at sea) is one that we take no pleasure in, but that we
think is a regrettably necessary one-both in terms of Haiti itself and in human terms.").
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
120. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae Sponsors of 1980 Refugee Act, supra note 47.
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legislated regularly with regard to immigration matters.' 2' Moreover,
Vietnam triggered a resurgence of congressional interest and activism in
foreign policy, particularly in fields such as international trade, which directly
affect congressional constituencies.1
In the wake of the Kennebunkport Order, various bills were introduced and
various committees held hearings about the refoulement policy and the
Guantdnamo camp.123 Both the Congressional Black Caucus and the sponsors
of the 1980 Refugee Act filed amicus briefs before the Supreme Court in
HCC-IL t24 But in the end Congress did not even come close to collective
action on the Haitian refugee issue. 25
Again, the explanation is both institutional and political. The same
institutional reforms that have stimulated a resurgence of congressional
activism in foreign policy have often left Congress too decentralized to
generate coherent policy initiatives. 26 The loss of such devices as the
legislative veto 27 has made it difficult for Congress to confront the President
unless it can muster the two-thirds vote in both houses necessary to override
a presidential veto.t28 Even if sufficient congressional interest had existed to
support legislation protecting the Haitians, Congress had neither the time nor
the incentive to enact it between Memorial Day and Election Day 1992,
particularly when the incoming President appeared likely to change the Haitian
policies by executive order.t29 Nor, before the Supreme Court ruled, was it
clear why Congress should expend resources enacting legislation to reaffirm
a nonrefoulement requirement that was already embodied in existing
legislation. After Clinton's election, congressional opponents of the Haitian
policy could not rally a Democrat-controlled Congress to oppose the first
121. HENRY STEINER, DETLEV VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS:
MATERIALS AND TEXT 15-18 (4th ed. 1994).
122. KOH, supra note 1, at 121.
123. See, e.g., Hearing on U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward Haiti, supra note 54; Hearing on U.S.
Policy Toward Haitian Refugees, supra note 54; Haitian Refugee Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 1307, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (March 11, 1993); H.R. Con. Res. 182, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 17, 1993); Haitian
Refugee Fairness Act, H.R. 3663, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 22, 1993); Governors Island Reinforcement
Act of 1994, H.R. 4114, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 23, 1994) ("Dellums Bill").
124. See, e.g., BriefAmici Curiae Sponsors of 1980 Refugee Act, supra note 47; Brief of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Transafrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 47.
125. At this writing, the only legislation with a chance of enactment is the Dellums Bill, H.R. 4114,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), and companion legislation in the Senate, introduced on April 19, 1994 by
Senator Dodd and four others, which provides, inter alia, for sanctions against Haiti and the halting of the
interdiction and return of Haitian refugees.
126. See KOH, supra note 1, at 121.
127. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
128. See KOH, supra note 1, at 141-44.
129. Nor did either presidential candidate have a strong incentive to support such legislation, given
the enormous hostility to illegal immigrants in Florida, one of the most hotly contested states in the 1992
presidential election. See generally Larry Rohter, Florida Seeks U.S. Aid for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993, at A12 (describing Florida's hostility toward illegal aliens).
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Democratic President in twelve years, particularly during his first weeks in
office.
In the end, political factors dictated congressional inaction. The Haitian
refugee crisis arose during an economic recession, traditionally a time in which
aliens have been scapegoated and borders tightened. 130 In contrast to Cuban
and Russian refugees, who enjoy significant legislative support, black, poor
Haitians afflicted with the HIV virus constitute the archetypal "discrete and
insular minority," for whom such support was not forthcoming.' 3 ' Through
a quirk in timing, the fate of the HIV-positive Haitians on Guantdnamo became
subordinated to the controversy over gays in the military, which the Clinton
administration ignited almost immediately upon taking office. Significantly, the
only legislative group to fight consistently for the Haitians, the Congressional
Black Caucus (CBC), ultimately played an important role in winning the
release of the Guantnamo Haitians. The District Court issued its opinion
ordering the Haitians' release just days after the President chose to withdraw
Lani Guinier as his nominee for Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights
Division. When members of the CBC finally met with President Clinton to rail
about the Guinier nomination, they also urged him to comply with the District
Court's ruling regarding the Guantdnamo Haitians. Ironically, the same
refugees who were victimized for months by racial politics probably owed their
freedom to the administration's decision not to antagonize domestic black
supporters by seeking a stay of a black judge's ruling in favor of black
Haitians.
C. Why the Court Deferred
Once the President acted and Congress stood by, it became almost
inevitable that the Supreme Court would validate the President's actions.
Indeed, the Court directly foreshadowed its ruling in HCC-II more than a year
earlier, when it denied certiorari to the Haitian Refugee Center's petition, with
only Justice Blackmun dissenting.'32 Indeed, during the previous two years,
the full Court had voted against the Haitians no less than eight times."'
130. See Richard L. Berke, Politicians Discovering an Issue: Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994,
at A19 ("From across Texas, Washington and California, Republicans and Democrats want to see, and be
seen at, a get-tough effort to control immigration.... The politicians are prompted by polls showing that
the issue is gaining an importance among voters who ... are increasingly worried about the economic
impact of immigrants and their effect on American culture.").
131. See JOHN H. ELY, DFIOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 161 (1980)
("Hostility toward 'foreigners' is a time-honored American tradition"); Harold Hongju Koh, The Archetypal
"Good" Aliens, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 88TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW
(forthcoming 1994) (arguing that Haitian refugees are the archetypal "bad aliens," disfavored under
American immigration law).
132. See Baker, 112 S. Ct. at 1245.
133. The Court had thrice intervened to stay lower court rulings favoring the Haitians. See Baker v.
Haitian Refugee Ctr., 112 S. Ct. 1072 (1992); McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1714
(1992); McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 3 (1992). Moreover, the Court had twice denied
1994] 2413
HeinOnline -- 103 Yale L.J. 2413 1993-1994
The Yale Law Journal
Most crucially, by a 7-2 vote, the Court had stayed the Second Circuit's ruling
blocking the Bush policy of summary return, thereby ensuring that the policy
would continue for at least eleven months before plenary Supreme Court
argument and decision." 4 Having tipped its hand by these acts, and
sanctioned refoulement in the interim, the Court could now hardly turn around
and declare it illegal.
Once the Clinton administration played the "presidential card" before the
Supreme Court, adopting the Bush policy as well as its briefs, the handwriting
was on the wall. After President Clinton changed his position, Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens-the potential swing votes-were left
to wonder, "If two presidents can live with refoulement (including one who
had once condemned it), why can't we?"
As Justice Blackmun's dissent cogently observed, the Court's opinion in
HCC-II rested on three implausible assertions: that "the word 'return' does not
mean return ... [that] the opposite of 'within the United States' is not outside
the United States, and ... [that] the official charged with controlling
immigration has no role in enforcing an order to control immigration.' 35
Justice Stevens first construed the legal prohibition against the "return" of
aliens as inapplicable to this kind of return. 36 But the Kennebunkport Order
itself authorized the Coast Guard "[t]o return" Haitian vessels and their
passengers to Haiti, precisely the act that the law forbade. t37 Justice Stevens
never explained why the plain meaning of the French word "refouler" did not
apply to the Haitian situation, when French newspapers were
contemporaneously reporting that "Les Etats-Unis ont drcid6 de refouler
directement les r~fugi~s recueillis par la garde c6ti&re.
''t31
Second, Congress changed the statutory language from "The Attorney
General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United
States" to read, without geographic limit, simply that "The Attorney General
stay requests from Haitian refugee groups, Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1073 (1992); Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); had granted certiorari over the Haitians' opposition, McNary
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); and had denied their motions both to expedite briefing,
McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 4 (1992), and to suspend briefing until after Inauguration
Day, MeNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 593 (1992).
134. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2549. Significantly, during the October 1992 Term, the
Supreme Court vacated or reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit in all but one of the eleven
decisions for which it granted review. See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second Circuit Review:
Performance in the U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 22, 1993, at 3.
135. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). I have
critiqued the Court's opinion in HCC-II in Reflections, supra note 4, at 15-17, from which this Part derives.
136. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2563-64 ("'return' has a legal meaning narrower than its
common meaning").
137. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.FR. 303-04 (1993) (appropriate directives will be issued
"providing for the Coast Guard ... to return the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it
came").
138. Le bourbier haYtien, LE MONDE, June 1, 1992, quoted in 113 S. Ct. at 2569 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The United States has decided to directly return the refugees picked up by the Coast Guard.")
(emphasis added).
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shall not deport or return any alien" to conditions of persecution. 39 Yet
Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had intended to extend statutory
protection only to aliens physically present within the United States, even
though Congress had specifically declined to use the term "alien physically
present in the United States," a phrase it employed frequently elsewhere in the
same statute. 140 Third, the Court concluded that the statute's directive to the
"Attorney General" somehow did not limit the actions of the President and
Coast Guard. 141 Yet, curiously, the Court appeared to acknowledge the self-
executing nature of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, which speaks of
"No Contracting State" and hence plainly binds the President as head-of-
state. 42 More troubling, the claim smacked of the Reagan administration's
claim during the Iran-Contra Affair that the Boland Amendments' restriction
upon United States agencies "involved in intelligence activities" did not bind
the National Security Council, even when it engaged in intelligence
activities.143 If the Coast Guard was not enforcing the immigration laws
when interdicting and returning fleeing Haitians, it was acting ultra vires and
without statutory authority. Yet if it was enforcing those laws, it could only do
so as an agent of the Attorney General, who alone by statute is granted "the
power and duty to control and guard the boundaries and borders of the United
States against the illegal entry of aliens," with the flat proviso that she "shall
not... return any alien" to conditions of persecution.144
But if the majority's decision was so implausible, why was the vote so
lopsided? On reflection, Haitian Centers Council stands at the crossroads of
three recent lines of Supreme Court precedent: cases misconstruing
international law, favoring presidential power, and disfavoring aliens and
human rights. Together, these jurisprudential strands wove a noose from which
plaintiffs could not escape.
139. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2552 n.2 (emphasis added).
140. Compare id. at 2561-62 with provisions cited in id. at 2575-76 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2559-60.
142. Justice Stevens' decision in Haitian Centers Council hinted that Article 33 should be considered
self-executing. See id. at 2562 & n.35. Consistent with this reading, Justice Stevens' prior opinions in INS
v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), had strongly suggested
that Article 33 bound U.S. officials of its own force as soon as the U.S. acceded to the Refugee Protocol
in 1968. See also INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 729 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[A]fter 1968 ... the Attorney General 'honored the dictates' of Article 33.1 in administering §
243(h).").
143. See Harold Hongju Koh, Boland Amendments, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 111, 112 (Leonard W. Levy & Louis Fisher eds., 1994).
144. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988), cited in Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. CL at 2575 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); 14 U.S.C. § 89(b) (1988) ("The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged...
in enforcing any law of the United States shall ... be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular
executive department... charged with the administration of the particular law [i.e., the Department of
Justice] ... and ... be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated by such Department ... with
respect to the enforcement of that law."); see also Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. CL at 2574 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("Even the challenged Executive Order places the Attorney General 'on the boat' with the
Coast Guard.").
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1. Misconstruing International Law
Haitian Centers Council takes its place atop a line of recent Supreme
Court precedent misconstruing international treaties. In the past few years, the
Court has sanctioned the emasculation of a range of treaties governing
international service of process, 145  taking of evidence, 146  bilateral
extradition, 147 and now nonrefoulement. In each case, at the Government's
urging, the Court applied a three-part technique that led it to sanction precisely
the result the treaty was drafted to prevent.
First, in each case, the Court read unambiguous language to be
ambiguous. 148 HCC-II represents the most egregious example, as a case not
of single, but double plain meaning. Both the statute and the treaty mandated
in unambiguous language the mutually reinforcing requirement that the United
States shall not return or "refouler" "any alien" or "refugee" to his persecutors.
The Court's role was to enforce this language as written, not to reconstrue it
in light of current anti-alien sentiment or foreign policy exigencies. Yet Justice
Stevens denied that either "return" or "refouler" meant "return" in this context,
and reconstrued "any alien" to mean "any alien physically present in the
United States."
Second, in each case the Court declined to construe the contested language
in light of the treaty's object and purpose. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties states the hornbook principle that treaties be construed
first according to both their ordinary meaning and their object and
purpose.'49 In each of the three predecessor cases, the object and purpose
was to make the treaty's procedures the normal and presumptive mode for
dealing with the problem in question. In Alvarez-Machain, Justice Stevens
vigorously dissented, reasoning that the Court had construed an extradition
treaty that was silent with regard to governmental kidnapping of criminal
145. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
146. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
147. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
148. Schlunk, for example, raised the question whether the Hague Service Convention "shall apply in
all cases... where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad."
486 U.S. at 699 (quoting Hague Service Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 362). Relying principally on the Solicitor
General's amicus brief, the Court held that U.S. plaintiffs are free to serve foreign defendants by serving
their U.S. agents by nontreaty means-a substantial narrowing of the treaty-because such cases present
no "occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." Id. at 707. Similarly, in
Adrospatiale, Justice Stevens read the permissive language of the Hague Evidence Convention as creating
no presumption in favor of resort to that treaty for extraterritorial discovery, even though the structure of
the treaty clearly suggested that the signatories expected the Convention to provide the normal channels
for transborder discovery. See 482 U.S. at 534-40. In Alvarez-Machain, the treaty's language demonstrated
the parties' intent to provide mandatory procedures governing the extradition of persons in all cases not
involving consensual rendition. Yet to avoid that language, the Court effectively wrote a new implied term
into the treaty to authorize forcible, unconsented governmental kidnapping. See 112 S. Ct. at 2199 n.ll
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Mhe Court has, in effect, written into Article 9 a new provision .... ").
149. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, art. 31.
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suspects to permit that result, which the treaty was drafted to forbid. 50
Writing for the Court in HCC-II, Justice Stevens similarly recognized that the
drafters of the Convention Relating To the Status of Refugees "may not have
contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them to
the one country they had desperately sought to escape; such actions may even
violate the spirit of Article 33 .''. Yet, instead of construing the statute's
words consistently with that object and purpose, Justice Stevens construed
them deliberately to offend the spirit of the treaty and the statute. As Justice
Blackmun recalled, the refugee treaty's purpose was to extend international
protections to those who, having fled persecution in their own country, could
no longer invoke that government's legal protection.'52 He further recalled
that the Convention was drafted to prevent a replay of the forced return of
Jewish refugees to Europe. 153 Yet, Justice Stevens construed the treaty in a
manner that would have permitted that result, so long as those refugees were
hunted down and taken on the high seas.
Third, by subordinating text, the Court has elevated snippets of negotiating
history into definitive interpretive guides. The Vienna Convention on Treaties
directs that reliance on a treaty's negotiating history is the alternative of last,
not first, resort. 54 Justice Scalia has specifically argued that if "the Treaty's
language resolves the issue presented, there is no necessity of looking further
to discover 'the intent of the parties."" 55 Yet, in HCC-II, the Court reversed
a decades-old interpretation of a multilateral treaty by relying on statements of
two foreign delegates that were never commented or voted upon by the United
States, that were never presented to or considered by the Senate during its
ratification of the Refugee Protocol, and that were explicitly rebutted by a
sworn affidavit submitted by the U.S. government official who negotiated the
treaty. 156
150. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Schlunk, 486 U.S. at
716 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("[H]ad we been content to rely on [the notions cited in the
Court's opinion], we would have found it unnecessary, in the first place, to participate in a [Service]
Convention .. "); Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 551 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("By viewing the Convention as merely optional .... the majority ignores the policies established by the
political branches when they negotiated and ratified the treaty.").
151. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2565 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Article 31 instructs courts to rely primarily on a treaty's language and purpose. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, art. 31. Article 32 permits use of the negotiating history
in treaty construction only as a last resort, and even then, only if a plain language analysis "leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure" or leads to a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable result." Id. art. 32.
155. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Majority, 489
U.S. at 366).
156. See Affidavit of Louis Henkin, appended to Brief for the Respondents, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., excerpts appended to Reflections, supra note 4, at 144-47. Alvarez-Machain, Schlunk, and
Adrospatiale each presented a variant on the same problem. In Alvarez-Machain, the Court read the
negotiating history of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty as failing "to show that abductions outside of the
Treaty constitute a violation of the Treaty." 112 S. Ct. at 2194 & n.11. But as Justice Stevens' dissent
demonstrated, the U.S. government in fact "offered no evidence from the negotiating record, ratification
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The Court further erred in invoking the "presumption against
extraterritoriality" to argue against applying § 243(h) of the INA to aliens
stopped on the high seas.'57 In its last three terms, the Court has refused to
apply United States law extraterritorially to protect victims of employment
discrimination,158  environmental harm,159  and federal torts. 16  But, as
Justice Blackmun pointed out, in HCC-II the Court applied the presumption
mechanically, without regard for the various rationales that underlie it. The
statutory presumption against extraterritoriality was designed primarily to avoid
judicial interpretations of a statute that infringe upon the rights of another
sovereign.161 Thus, the presumption should have had no force or relevance
on the high seas, where no possibility exists for conflicts with other
jurisdictions.
Nor did it make sense to presume that Congress had legislated with
exclusively territorial intent when enacting a law governing a distinctively
international subject matter-the transborder movement of refugees-that
enforced an international human rights obligation embodied in a multilateral
convention. Perhaps such a presumption might make sense when Congress
regulates commercial activity, as opposed to immigration. But only a week
after applying the presumption in HCC-II, the Court permitted extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct that produces a substantial
anticompetitive effect in the United States, without explaining exactly how the
presumption against extraterritoriality had been overcome.' 62
process, or later communications with Mexico to support the suggestion" of the Court: that the contracting
states somehow intended to authorize unilateral invasions of each other's territorial integrity to abduct
criminal suspects. Id. at 2199 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Schlunk majority repeatedly cited
snippets of negotiating history to argue that service is required via the Hague Service Convention only
when the internal law of the forum state says there is "occasion to transmit" judicial documents for service
abroad. 486 U.S. at 700-04. But, as Justice Brennan observed, statements by the U.S. delegation in the
negotiating history strongly suggested the opposite conclusion: that the Convention's terms "embody a
sustantive standard that limits a forum's latitude to deem service complete domestically." 486 U.S. at 708,
710-15 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Finally, in Adrospatiale, the Court referred to negotiating
history to avoid resort to the Hague Discovery Convention, 482 U.S. at 534-38, notwithstanding Justice
Blackmun's demonstration that "the very purpose of the United States' participation in the treaty
negotiations" was to obtain effective treaty procedures for securing extraterritorial discovery through treaty-
based means. Id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2560.
158. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
159. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (dismissing for lack of standing); see also
id. at 2150 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (relying on presumption against
extraterritoriality).
160. Smith v. United States, 113 U.S. 1178 (1993) (declining to apply Federal Tort Claims Act to tort
claims arising in Antarctica).
161. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909-11 (1993) ("Although the proposition
was perhaps not always free from doubt,.., it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies"
to certain extraterritorial conduct) (citation omitted). Significantly, Justice Scalia's partial dissent for himself
and three others who had joined the HCC majority invoked the canon that statutes should not be interpreted
to conflict with international law. See id. at 2919 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet if properly applied in HCC-IJ,
that canon would have militated for, not against, extraterritorial application of the nonrefoulement provision
of the INA. See HCC-II, 113 S. Ct. at 2575 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting how the Court,
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Finally, whether or not the Court properly applied the presumption against
extraterritorial application of the INA, it should not have applied it to presume
that the United States' obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention
are territorial.'63 It is nonsense to presume that treaty parties contract solely
for domestic effect. Generally applied, such a presumption would permit the
United States to commit genocide or torture on the high seas, notwithstanding
the universal, peremptory prohibitions of the Genocide and TortureConventions. t6'
In short, Haitian Centers Council looks curiously inward at a time when
our allies look outward to greater reliance on international law to facilitate
international commerce, migration, and democratization. The majority assumed
that Congress did not mean what it said when it ratified a mutually reinforcing
statute and treaty, that the negotiating parties intended through floor debate to
undercut the treaty's explicit object and purpose, and that Congress enacted
universal human rights obligations governing transborder activities with an
exclusively territorial focus. The Court's consistent misinterpretation of
international law reminds us that our current Justices, unlike John Marshall and
John Jay, are no longer former diplomats well-schooled in the law of nations.
Neither the Justices nor their clerks display command of basic international law
precepts, at a time when the United States remains the world's only surviving
superpower.'6' Our judges display both collective amnesia and minimal
comfort when construing international law.166 It hardly surprises, then, that
they should look to other sources of guidance when deciding international law
cases.
erroneously "reasoning backwards .... actually looks to the American scheme to illuminate the Treaty"
(emphasis in original)).
163. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2565 ("[A] treaty cannot impose uncontemplated
extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general humanitarian intent.").
164. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, "The presumption [against extraterritoriality] runs throughout
the majority's opinion," including, inexplicably, its analysis of the treaty. Id. at 2576 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
165. On the day after announcing his retirement, Justice Blackmun made precisely this point in a
speech before the American Society of International Law. See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and
the Law of Nations- Owing a Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 88TH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW (Apr. 7, 1994) (forthcoming 1994) (criticizing
the Court for misconstruing international law in Alvarez-Machain, HCC, and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361 (1989) (permitting execution of certain juvenile offenders)).
166. TPLL, supra note 2, at 2362-64, 2394-98. It is striking that in this day and age, international law
is still not a required subject in United States law schools. Nor are basic rules of international law tested
on either state or multistate bar examinations, even though the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Doc. AIConf. 97/18, Annex I (Vienna 1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988),
for example, now overrides state contract rules as the governing law with respect to contracts for the sale
of goods between parties whose places of business are located in contracting states.
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2. Favoring Presidential Power
The line of Supreme Court precedents favoring presidential power presents
the most prominent alternative source. The President has not lost a major
foreign affairs case before the Court since the Steel Seizure case, and he has
won many by asserting assorted justiciability defenses. 67 In at least one of
these cases, Justice Stevens provided the President with the decisive vote on
the merits. 68 One dim silver lining of HCC-II is that the Court refused to
credit the Government's various claims of nonreviewability, thus avoiding
broad future insulation of parallel executive conduct from judicial
examination.
169
Justice Stevens did, however, add two new and surprising glosses to
existing presidential power precedents. First, in dictum he cited the infamous
Curtiss-Wright case 17  to suggest that the statutory presumption against
extraterritoriality has "special" force when courts construe "statutory provisions
that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has
unique responsibility.' 171 But as Justice Blackmun correctly noted, "[t]he
presumption that Congress did not intend to legislate extraterritorially has less
force-perhaps, indeed, no force at all-when a statute on its face relates to
foreign affairs.' 72 In such circumstances, the presumption should in fact, run
the other way, i.e., in favor of extraterritorial application of United States law
unless Congress otherwise indicates. 73
Second, the Court blindly accepted the Government's claim, newly minted
for oral argument, that the case "concern[ed] the scope of the President's
emergency powers to adopt measures that he deems to be necessary to prevent
a mass migration of aliens across the high seas."174 Yet the plaintiffs never
sued the President, only his subordinates. Nor did they challenge his
167. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally cases cited in
KOH, supra note 1, at 134-49.
168. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding Reagan administration's authority to regulate
travel to Cuba).
169. The Government claimed that the Second Circuit's ruling was collaterally estopped by the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker; that the INA precluded judicial review of
plaintiffs' claims for classwide relief; and that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702(1) (1988),
required the District Court to dismiss the case and deny equitable relief. See Brief of Petitioners at 13-27,
55-57, Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344). The Court did not even mention these arguments in rendering
its ruling on the merits.
170. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also KOH, supra note 1,
at 94 ("Among government attorneys, Justice Sutherland's lavish description of the president's powers is
so often quoted that it has come to be known as the 'Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right' cite .....
171. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2567.
172. Id. at 2577 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
173. For a persuasive argument along these lines, see generally Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1992).
174. Transcript of Oral Argument (Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney) at I (emphasis added). Cf.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2567 ("[W]e are not persuaded that either [treaty or statute] places any
limit on the President's authority to repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial seas of the United
States.").
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constitutional authority to direct foreign and military policy. Neither President
Bush nor President Clinton issued a new proclamation nor declared a national
emergency to deal with the refugee problem. The President's executive order
did not even mandate that the Attorney General or Coast Guard return
interdicted Haitians to Haiti. Instead, the President only ordered that
"appropriate instructions" be issued, "provided ... that the attorney general,
in his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will
not be returned without his consent."'175 The plaintiffs argued that the
President's order could not grant the Attorney General such unreviewable
discretion to return possible refugees, because the statute, treaty and executive
agreement all removed that discretion. Even on the high seas, they argued, the
President's word is not the only law: Just as the Taft-Hartley Act had removed
Secretary Sawyer's discretion to seize Youngstown's steel mills during the
Korean War, section 243(h) of the INA, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention,
and the 1981 U.S.-Haiti accord each removed the Attorney General's discretion
to return fleeing refugees in far less emergent circumstances.
176
The Court rejected that claim, deciding that the presumption against
extraterritoriality prevented the statute from removing that discretion.'77 But
strangely, the Court chose to invoke the presumption in a case where the
executive branch itself had cited the statute as the basis for its own
extraterritorial authority to act. If, as the Court concluded, the presumption
operated to deny the Haitians extraterritorial statutory protection, a fortiori it
should also have operated to deny the President extraterritorial authority to stop
the Haitians in the first place.178 Thus, properly understood, HCC fell within
Category III of Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown, in which
the executive's "power is at its lowest ebb" because executive officials act in
a manner "incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress,' 79
expressed here in the statutory and treaty mandates that "[v]ulnerable refugees
shall not be returned" to their persecutors.'
3. Disfavoring Aliens and Human Rights
Finally, HCC joins the long line of recent Court rulings disfavoring aliens
and denying enhanced judicial protection for international human rights.'
175. Exec. Order 12,807, supra note 25, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1992).
176. Indeed, HCC presented an even less compelling case than Youngstown, inasmuch as the Taft-
Hartley Act, unlike INA § 243(h), did not expressly remove the lower executive official's discretion to
perform the challenged act.
177. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2560.
178. See Brief for the Respondents, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., excerpts appended to
Reflections, supra note 4, at 40.
179. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
180. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. For a review of the Court's immigration jurisprudence, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255 (1985). For discussion
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If, as I have argued elsewhere, the archetypal "good" alien favored by
American immigration law is a white, European, healthy, heterosexual, self-
sufficient refugee, arriving alone in search of political asylum.-Mikhail
Baryshnikov, for example-it hardly surprises that black, poor Caribbean
migrants arriving in large numbers, many afflicted with IRV (a disease
associated with homosexuals) should fare poorly in our courts. 8 In addition
to the Haitian case, in the last two terms alone, the Court upheld the INS
policy of arresting and detaining unaccompanied minors,1 83 and vacated
lower court orders directing the INS to accept legalization applications beyond
the statutory deadline. 184 Although the Court has long disfavored aliens
seeking entry into the United States,18 in recent years it has come to look
skeptically even upon the claims of asylum seekers 86 as well as those
invoking not an affirmative right to enter, but the negative right not to be
returned to their persecutors. 87
The Court's skepticism toward this basic human right reflects its broader
reluctance to apply enhanced judicial scrutiny to international human rights
abuses. In recent years, the Court has denied foreign plaintiffs the right to sue
foreign sovereigns under the Alien Tort Statute' 88 and denied a criminal
defendant the protection of an extradition treaty crafted to prevent his
kidnapping. 89 Last year, in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the Court immunized a
foreign sovereign for using police to commit torture within an employment
relationship, reasoning that "however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may
be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has long been
understood ... as peculiarly sovereign in nature.''tg
The Nelson Court's reasoning suggests that the Court has yet to grasp two
fundamental international human rights principles established at Nuremberg:
that courts may pierce the veil of state sovereignty when governmental officials
of the numerous judicial rulings against Haitians, see, e.g., Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A
History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 269 (1993); Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration
Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993).
182. See generally Koh, supra note 131.
183. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
184. Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993).
185. See U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."), cited in
Transcript, supra note 174, at 4 (oral argument of Deputy Solicitor General Maureen Mahoney).
186. INS v. Elias-Zecharias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (defining narrowly circumstances in which alien
fears persecution because of political opinion).
187. The Court had previously taken more generous views of the right to nonrefoulement in INS v.
Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), and INS v. Doherty, 112 S.
Ct. 719, 729 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
189. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). As Justice Stevens recognized in
Alvarez-Machan, extradition treaties exist not simply to impose obligations on states to surrender criminal
suspects, but also to safeguard fugitives' rights and to protect individual freedom against arbitrary
detentions. Id. at 2197-2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (1993).
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commit international crimes, and that "courts-both international and
domestic-are peculiarly appropriate fora for determining official rights and
responsibilities for crimes against humanity. 1 91
Not surprisingly, HCC's statist account of the President's struggle to deal
with the modest Haitian refugee outflow never mentioned the human plight of
the refugees themselves. 192 Only Justice Blackmun, long a guardian of
human rights, international law, and aliens, 193 heard the Haitians' "modest
plea, vindicated by the Treaty and the Statute" that "the United States, land of
refugees and guardian of freedom, cease forcibly driving them back to
detention, abuse, and death."' 94
IV. THE "HAITI PARADIGM" IN U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
The Court's opinion in HCC took pains to specify that neither the morality
nor the "wisdom of the policy choices made by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton is ... a matter for our consideration."' 195 But no assessment of the
Haitian crisis would be complete without evaluating the soundness of those
policies.
A conventional wisdom now heard is that President Bush wisely "bit the
bullet" on the Haitian refugee problem. In a world of failed states, global
recession, and massive refugee outflows, the argument goes, the United States
needed to draw a line in the sea somewhere, akin to the "line in the sand"
drawn when Iraq invaded Kuwait. By this reasoning, the HCC lawsuit
quixotically avoided the real problem: that candidate Clinton was naive to
make his campaign promises to fleeing Haitians in the first place. Under this
view, President Clinton was wrong before, but is right now. Upon taking office
he finally recognized that returning Haiti's refugees was in America's interests
and thus chose to maintain Bush's repatriation policy.
In my judgment, this assessment is upside down. President Clinton was
right before and is wrong now. Watching the U.S. Government's Haitian
policy unfold has been like watching a slow-motion train wreck, as two
administrations have missed or mishandled one policy opportunity after
another. As it currently stands, our policy toward Haiti is perilously close to
upside down: too hard on Haitian refugees, yet too soft on the illegal military
coup. The United States government has failed to recognize or fully promote
191. TPLL, supra note 2, at 2359. See generally Paul Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The
United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 5-12 (1987).
192. 113 S. Ct. at 2552-56.
193. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1985); Blackrnun, supra note 165.
194. 113 S. Ct. at 2577 (Blackmnun, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2556.
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its national interests in preserving democracy and human rights in Haiti. How
did this happen?
A. The Haiti Paradigm
Even a quick look back at the Haiti Story, sketched in Part II, reveals its
paradigmatic character. A powerful developed nation, here the United States,
proclaims a policy of supporting and promoting democracy and human rights
abroad. Another nation, here Haiti, attempts to construct both civil society and
political order against large odds. That effort fails, because of coup d'6tat,
insurrection, civil strife, or external invasion, yet the United States' initial
response is largely executive inaction.
Unchecked, human rights abuses start to worsen and proliferate. Refugees
begin to flee, in increasingly large numbers. 96 At this point, the executive
branch finally reacts forcefully, but to the refugees, not the underlying political
crisis. This period of executive action is followed by legislative inaction, in
response to which private litigants-nongovernmental organizations and human
rights advocates-bring a transnational public lawsuit, seeking to prod the
government to more proactive, human rights-sensitive measures. After initial
judicial victories, the harsh executive position begins to soften, but that
response ends when the Court legitimates the executive action. The net result
is upside-down human rights policy. The U.S. government's official positions,
now legitimated by judicial endorsement and legislative acquiescence, are anti-
refugee and curiously tolerant of human rights abusers, a far cry from the
officially enunciated policies of democracy and human rights.
Although the recent Haitian saga plays out this scenario most completely,
with variations, we have witnessed this paradigm unfolding in numerous
locales over the last two decades: in Burma, Cambodia, Cuba, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Liberia, Rwanda and Vietnam, just to name some of the most
obvious. Some large-scale refugee outflows of, for example, Chinese, Cuban
Marielitoes, Ugandan Asians, and Burmese Arakan Muslims, have resulted
from specific policies of expulsion or repression pursued by domestic
rulers. 9 7  Other refugee outflows that have transpired outside this
hemisphere-for example, the flights of Albanian, Bangladeshi, Bosnian,
Cambodian, Somalian, and Vietnamese refugees-have mainly affected
countries other than the United States. 9
196. For an intriguing examination of the paradigmatic link between political strife, environmental
scarcity, and refugee outflows, as illustrated in Haiti, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, Across the Threshold:
Empirical Evidence on Environmental Scarcities as Causes of Violent Conflict, INTERNATIONAL SECURrrY
(forthcoming Spring 1994) (manuscript at 23-25, on file with author).
197. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL REFUGEE
CRISIS 19 (1994).
198. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1993, at 41-47, 157-61, 193-200, 206-09,
262-78 (1993).
2424 [Vol. 103: 2391
HeinOnline -- 103 Yale L.J. 2424 1993-1994
1994] The Haiti Paradigm 2425
On some occasions, the paradigm has not played out fully, because one
institutional player or another has not played its expected role. In rare cases,
for example, Congress has overcome inertia and become energized, heading off
this vicious cycle by provoking the executive branch to take firmer action in
the initial phase of the crisis.199 Similarly, although transnational lawsuits
like HCC have rarely won final judgments, they have sometimes worked
amelioration of U.S. government policy, usually as damage-control and public
awareness measures, filed after governmental malfeasance or nonfeasance have
reached objectionable levels.200 In short, neither legislative action nor private
litigation can retrospectively cure initial failures of executive policy-whether
unjustified inaction or misguided reaction-that are committed early in a
human rights crisis. The question thus becomes: By what principles should
executive officials act when there is still time to forestall a human rights
debacle?
B. The Haiti Lessons
To measure an administration's human rights performance, we need to
evaluate both the administration's rhetoric and its actions.20' With regard to
rhetoric, President Clinton deserves great credit for being the first American
President since Jimmy Carter to place human rights prominently on his foreign
policy agenda.02 Secretary of State Christopher's opening address to the
199. See, for example, Congress' role in supporting Corazon Aquino's fledgling government in the
Philippines. Carl H. Lande & Richard Hooley, Aquino Takes Charge, 64 FOR. AFF. 1087 (1986). On other
occasions, Congress has acted only after the human rights crisis has become protracted. See, e.g., RICHARD
LUGAR, LETTERS TO THE NEXT PRESIDENT 208-47 (1988) (describing battle over South Africa sanctions
bill); DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 137-51 (1988).
200. In addition to the Haitian and Chinese suits, cited in supra note 102, see also Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Committee
of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788
F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986) (challenging as arbitrary long-term detention of
Mariel Cubans).
201. An administration's rhetoric can be judged by how broadly it chooses to define human rights and
the extent to which it judges the protection of those rights to be in the national interest. An administration's
actions encompass its personnel appointments, acts of intervention (to prevent ongoing human rights
abuses), acts of accountability (to promote remedies for past human rights abuses), and preventive measures
(to forestall future human rights abuses).
202. That pattern began during the campaign in candidate Clinton's speech to the University of
Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs on October 1, 1992. Democracy and human rights were also a
prominent theme of Clinton's State of the Union Speech in January 1994, President William J. Clinton,
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1994), reprinted in
WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 154-55 (1994), and Warren Christopher's Senate
confirmation hearings, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fed. News Serv., Jan. 13, 1993,
at 71, 86 (Confirmation Hearing for Warren Christopher as Secretary of State), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curmt File. President Jimmy Carter had decided early in his presidency that "the demonstration
of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and [that] moral principles
were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence." CARTER, supra note 108, at
143. Yet Carter was by no means the first President to emphasize international human rights. Woodrow
'Wilson's interest in the League of Nations, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech, 87-1
CONG. REc. 44 (1941), and John F. Kennedy's inaugural address all sounded idealistic human rights
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Vienna World Conference on Human Rights serves as the touchstone for a
Clinton foreign policy of "democracy and human rights. 20 3 Yet on closer
examination, Secretary Christopher's observation that "advancing democratic
values and human rights serves our deepest values as well as our practical
interests" carefully straddles the twin rationales usually urged for promoting
human rights abroad: the intrinsic rationale ("promoting human rights is right
and comports with our national values") and the instrumental rationale
("promoting human rights serves our national interests"). 2 4  Thus,
Christopher's rhetoric hinted that the Clinton administration had accepted the
Reagan-Bush administration's rhetorical shift away from Jimmy Carter's
intrinsic emphasis on promoting human rights per se toward an instrumentalist
emphasis on promoting democracy-and through a "trickle down" effect,
human rights-as a means to pursuing other national interests.0 5
In hindsight, the Bush administration's instrumentalist human rights policy
failed to define any vision of the proper role of human rights in the "New
World Order." Thus, while President Bush presided over human rights
advances in Eastern Europe, South Africa, Central America, to name several
areas, he never articulated why human rights should take consistent priority in
U.S. foreign policy. During the campaign, candidate Bill Clinton recognized
themes. The impetus for the Carter human rights policy came from Congress in 1973-1974 amid its post-
Watergate, post-Vietnam disgust over the perceived amorality of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. During
that period, Congressman Don Fraser of Minnesota held numerous hearings before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements that led to the enactment
of a series of laws designed to elevate the status of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. See generally
FRANK NEWMAN & DAvID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 502-44 (1990).
203. In that speech, he said:
Over the course of two centuries, Americans have found that advancing democratic values and
human rights serves our deepest values as well as our practical interests.
That is why the United States stands with the men and women everywhere who are standing
up for these principles. And that is why President. Clinton has made reinforcing democracy and
protecting human rights a pillar of our foreign policy....
In this post-Cold War era, we are at a new moment. Our agenda for freedom must
embrace every prisoner of conscience, every victim of torture, every individual denied basic
human rights.
Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands, Address Before the Vienna World Conference on
Human Rights (June 14, 1993), reprinted in 4 DEP'T STATE DISPATCH, No. 25, at 1.
204. For an earlier defense of the position that human rights in U.S. foreign policy serves our national
interests, see Warren Christopher, Human Rights and the National Interest, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Current Policy No. 206 (1980), reprinted in NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note
202, at 504:
A firm emphasis on human rights is not an alternative to "realpolitik," nor is it simply a
side issue in our foreign policy. It is, instead, a central part of a pragmatic, tough-minded
policy. Our human rights policy serves not just the ideals but the interests of the United States.
205. This instrumentalist turn led President Reagan, for example, to appeal for Contra funding in the
language of democracy and human rights, see Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights,
64 FOR. AFFs. 1066 (1986), and led President Bush to use the rhetoric of human rights to rally a coalition
of nations against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, while ignoring that rhetoric in the face of nondemocratic
human rights abuses by governments such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. For the theoretical wellspring of
this policy, see Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 34.
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and attacked this failing.06 But it remained to be seen whether his
administration could articulate and sustain a principled human rights policy that
would not be jettisoned in the face of perceived competing national interests.
Would Clinton's heightened rhetoric on democracy and human rights translate
into intrinsic support for human rights, or constitute implicit acceptance of a
limited, instrumentalist human rights agenda that aimed principally to promote
market-based democracies?
At Vienna, Secretary Christopher conceded that "[i]n the battle for
democracy and human rights, words matter, but what we do matters much
more."207 Although the administration's early appointments in human rights
have been excellent, °0 the acid test of a nation's human rights policy comes
when it contemplates intervention to prevent ongoing abuses.
When the United States confronts consistent patterns of gross human rights
violations of the kind that have occurred in Haiti since the September 1991
coup, a range of foreign policy options are at its disposal. These options can
be grouped into four levels, ranging from Level One, the least interventionistic,
to Level Four, the most interventionistic. Level One, Domestic Actions,
includes all of those policy steps our government could take at home in the
United States, without the help or assistance of other nations, to condemn
human rights abuses abroad. Such measures include: (1) adopting international
human rights standards as U.S. domestic law by treaty or statute; (2)
maintaining consistent public moral outrage and condemnation of human rights
abuses abroad; (3) accurately monitoring, reporting, and certifying those
abuses; and (4) providing temporary safe haven for refugees who come to our
shores-not necessarily asylum, but some form of temporary refuge or
protected status until the political crisis can be solved.
Level Two, Political Intervention, embraces more proactive policy
measures, such as (1) diplomatic intervention and (2) regional political action,
and so forth, for example, the "mobilization of shame" through OAS
resolutions. Moving to Level Three, Economic Intervention, a nation can
withhold carrots-deny economic benefits---or brandish sticks-impose
economic sanctions. Denial of benefits includes withholding (1) trade benefits,
such as Most-Favored-Nation Status, membership in the General System of
Preferences, etc.; (2) multilateral loans; (3) visas; (4) export licenses; (5) air
206. In his 1992 Wisconsin speech, supra note 202, Clinton declared:
Our nation has a higher purpose than to coddle dictators and stand aside from the global
movement toward democracies ... President Bush seems too often to prefer a foreign policy
that embraces stability at the expense of freedom.
207. Christopher, supra note 204, at 1.
208. For example, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck, Solicitor General Drew Days, INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner, and National Security staff member Morton Halperin all have substantial
human rights backgrounds. It remains to be seen how much they will be actually involved in substantive
policymaking. In the Haitian situation, for example, it seems clear that Shattuck's voice, at least, has been
suppressed. See Steven A. Holmes, Rebuking Aide, U.S. Says Haiti Policy Stands, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16,
1993, at A6; text accompanying note 228 infra.
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landing rights; (6) foreign aid;209 or (7) anything else the target nation might
hold dear-the Olympic Games, for example, in the recent case of China.
Imposition of economic sanctions includes the whole range of options available
under the President's unilateral or multilateral emergency economic powers,
for example, (1) assets freezes, (2) trade embargoes, and (3) blockades of
oil. 210
Finally, when all else fails, the U.S. could theoretically pursue "Level
Four" options: Military Intervention.2 u Such options would range from (1)
limited forms of humanitarian rescue, to (2) military intervention to provide
food and humanitarian assistance-as in Somalia, for example-to (3) limited
intervention, to (4) larger-scale multilateral enforcement activities.
We need not agree on how far the U.S. should go in any particular
situation to agree upon six basic propositions. First, displaying nonneutrality
in the face of gross violations of human rights. Even if the United States is not
prepared to intervene to stop the abuses, it should not act as a neutral broker
between perpetrators and victims of gross human rights abuses.
Second, keeping the pressure up. If the U.S. government chooses to
intervene, whatever it chooses to do at Level One (Domestic Actions) should
not be relaxed as it moves up the spectrum to higher levels of sanctions. Thus,
if the Haitian regime proves recalcitrant, the United States should keep the
pressure constant at the low end of the intervention spectrum, then rachet up
the pressure as more leverage is needed.
Third, avoiding doing too little, too late. Economic sanctions will not bite
if a nation freezes bank accounts after the deposits have been withdrawn;
similarly, oil embargoes will not work if they are imposed after stockpiles have
been built up. Democracies are fragile, and once a democratically elected
government has been ousted, its ability to resume power has a very short half-
life. Many Level Three sanctions will mean nothing unless they are imposed
swiftly and aggressively.
Fourth, offering safe haven. The refugee outflow from Haiti is not the
problem, but the symptom. While Aristide was in power, few Haitians fled. To
solve the human rights crisis, a nation must first address the democracy crisis.
But at the same time, it must show the refugees minimal compassion by
offering them some form of refuge until democracy is restored.212
209. This includes security assistance under § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304 (1988), or general or country-specific development assistance under § 116 of the same act. See
generally NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 202, at 510-22.
210. See generally BARRY CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1988).
211. By listing military intervention as a policy option, I do not necessarily advocate it for Haiti, nor
do I address the domestic constitutional question of whether congressional approval would be required for
such action under either the War Powers Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, or the
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
212. Ironically, this point was recognized in 1980 by then-Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher in a speech entitled "Human Rights and the National Interest," where he observed:
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Fifth, demanding accountability for gross abuses. Human rights violators
have no incentive to cease their violations unless they know they will be held
accountable for their crimes.213 Broad amnesty provisions effectively require
democratically elected leaders to tolerate and coexist with killers.
Sixth and finally, pursuing regional burden-sharing approaches to the
restoration of democracy and human rights. For example, both refugee policy
and the restoration of democracy in Haiti are American, not exclusively United
States', problems. Both issues affect all nations in the region, and should be
addressed by short- and long-term multilateral solutions agreed to by the
member states of Organization of American States (OAS) and the United
Nations. The goal of any effective United States policy should thus be to
develop long-term regional burden-sharing solutions to the democracy
problems, while initiating interim measures to address the refugee problem
humanely and to mobilize public and multilateral support for both efforts.
Applying these principles of intervention, what should the United States
have done in September 1991, when the Aristide government was first
overthrown? At the outset, the United States should have begun at Level One
measures and moved quickly up the scale, keeping the pressure up and
avoiding too little, too late. The United States should have aggressively
criticized the Haitian regime for violating international human rights;
accurately monitored, reported, and certified human rights abuses; and put into
place a humane temporary safe haven policy for Haitian refugees until
democracy could be restored. Applying the regional burden-sharing principle,
the United States should have quickly convened regional bodies to develop a
program of multilateral action toward both the Haitian military regime and the
interim problem of dealing with refugee outflows. Such a program would have
been authorized by the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the various
OAS resolutions urging the restoration of constitutional government in
Haiti.2 t4
As the crisis continued, our government should have kept the pressure up.
Without relaxing moral condemnation, political reporting, or its safe haven
policy (Level One responses), the government should have moved quickly to
full-scale economic sanctions, (Level Three), while preserving limited forms
of military intervention as an option. In negotiations with the coup leaders, the
[O]ur support for human rights may offer the only long-term solution to one of the most
pressing problems on the international agenda-the problem of refugees .... When a
government respects the human rights of its citizens, refugees are a rare phenomenon. And we
know that refugees are more likely to return home when the human rights situation has
improved at home.
Christopher, supra note 204, at 506.
213. See LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SErLING AccouNTs WITH ToRTuRERs
4 (1990) (accountability is the difference "between knowledge and acknowledgement... knowledge when
it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public cognitive scene" (quoting philosopher
Thomas Nagel)).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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United States should have acted not as a neutral broker, but as a backer of the
democratic government, and should have flatly rejected any pleas for amnesty
for gross human rights abuses.
In fact, the U.S. government did not follow these straightforward policy
prescriptions. When the Haitian coup occurred in the fall of 1991, the Bush
administration started at Level One, with moral condemnation and regional
approaches to political solutions, but imposed economic sanctions too slowly
and timidly. When boatloads of refugees started to come, the Bush
administration began to view the refugees, not the regime, as the problem.
The Bush administration never fully understood that the Haitians sought
nonrefoulement, not entry. Those with credible fears of persecution did not
demand asylum, but only safe haven until order in Haiti was restored. Nor
would granting safe haven within the United States have been nearly as
burdensome as alarmists predicted. The United States had taken in as many as
900,000 Cubans over the past several decades.215 By comparison, during six
months of unregulated out-migration, with little or no political progress on
restoration of democracy at home, only 34,000 Haitians fled.216 Even this
relatively small group of refugees could have been held lawfully in a truly
humanitarian refugee camp at Guantdnamo.217
In May 1992, instead of pursuing these lawful options, President Bush
abandoned the safe haven principle altogether and adopted an unprecedented
policy of summarily returning all Haitians directly to Haiti. Once he took this
step, it became inevitable that his administration would trim its Level One
intervention, relax its moral condemnation of human rights violations in Haiti,
skew its monitoring and reporting of those abuses, and undercut the acceptance
of international human rights standards at home.
Then-presidential candidate Clinton appropriately criticized the "Bush
Administration's cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal
dictatorship without an asylum hearing. 218 Yet upon assuming office, he
endorsed that policy as his own and defended the Bush repatriation policy
before the Supreme Court. The Clinton administration simply did not search
long or hard enough before adopting the Bush alternative of summary
215. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League, supra note
44, at 13.
216. 113 S. Ct. at 2554.
217. The HCC plaintiffs never objected to the refugees' being held on Guantdnamo per se; rather, they
objected to the United States military treating refugees there like prisoners of war, denying them due
process rights, access to counsel, and adequate medical and living conditions. The base is 47 square miles
large and does have substantial available capacity. A lawful, humanitarian safe-haven site could have been
prepared at Guantdnamo with the following features: shelters capable of withstanding the elements; refugees
housed in family groups and allowed freedom of movement within the camp; U.S. private voluntary
agencies and the UNHCR, rather than the military, assisting in the administration of the camp (e.g.,
religious, education, and recreational services); the U.S. Public Health Service, rather than the military,
providing health care; and mail and phone access as well as ready access for press, human rights monitors,
volunteer religious organizations, doctors, and lawyers.
218. See Litigating as Law Students, supra note 4. at n.61.
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refoulement. All the Haitians asked was that the Clinton administration return
to the decade-old Reagan-Bush policy of interviewing Haitians before returning
them to their alleged persecutors. Surely with enough jawboning, and a firm
commitment to the principle of regional-burden-sharing, the administration
could have persuaded other nations in the region-such as Canada, Venezuela,
and Mexico-to take their share of refugees while the political crisis was being
negotiated. Similarly, the Clinton administration has never acknowledged that
its offer of refugee processing at sites within Haiti has provided minimal relief
for Haitians genuinely fearful of political persecution.21 9 Even those rare
refugees who have successfully pursued in-country processing have been
arrested and held for days by the Haitian military, despite protests from the
White House itself. 220 Nor did the administration adequately explore the
"Kurdistan Solution," that is, the possibility of forestalling dangerous sea
voyages by establishing safe-haven sites within Haiti.22'
At Governors Island last summer, these errors were compounded. Instead
of keeping the pressure up, Clinton administration spokesmen urged that the
trade sanctions be lifted before President Aristide returned to Haiti. After
sanctions were lifted, the coup leaders stockpiled oil for months, giving them
supplies to weather the subsequent reimposition of sanctions. In attempting to
broker a neutral settlement, the Clinton envoys supported a broad grant of
amnesty to the military leaders even for major human rights abuses, violating
principles of accountability and effectively eliminating the junta's incentives
not to work such abuses. The United States did not insist that the key coup
leaders leave Haiti, although our government had not hesitated to make similar
requests in the cases of Jean-Claude Duvalier, Prosper Avril, and Ferdinand
219. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Human Rights Watch, supra note 43.
220. A case in point is that of a Haitian soldier who refused to obey the military regime, fled Haiti
by boat, and was summarily returned pursuant to the Kennebunkport Order. When he applied for refugee
status in Haiti, United States immigration authorities finally recognized his well-founded fears of
persecution and gave his application expedited status. Yet even after that application was approved, he was
arrested by military officials at the airport in Haiti and held for six days, winning release only after a rare,
direct protest from the White House. See Deborah Sontag, Haiti Arrests Man on Way to Asylum in the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at A8.
221. See, e.g., David Martin, Strategies for a Resistant World: Human Rights Initiatives and the Need
for Alternatives to Refugee Interdiction, 26 CORNELL IRr'L L.J. 753, 766 (1993); Michael Stopford,
Humanitarian Assistance in the Wake of the Persian Gulf War, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 491 (1993). The Clinton
administration could have asked the United Nations and/or the OAS to establish safe-haven zones at several
sites inside Haiti. Such zones could have been established near the islands and coast cities known to be
prime departure points for boat people seeking to flee Haiti. Alternatively, they could have been placed
along the Dominican border (even, with consent, on the Dominican side) to help stop the illegal flow of
goods across the border. These safe-haven zones could have been controlled or monitored by UNHCR, and
protected by a multinational OAS or UN peacekeeping force, to provide refugees with food, shelter, and
protection from persecution. Such zones would have provided refugees temporary safe haven inside Haiti,
thereby controlling migration consistent with American interests by reducing Haitians' incentive to take to
the high seas. An international presence within Haiti would have further exerted pressure on the Haitian
military junta to comply with international minimum standards. Moreover, overseas refugee processing
could have taken place within the safe-haven zones in Haiti, overseen by international human rights
monitors from both UNHCR and nongovernmental organizations.
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Marcos, for example. When it became clear that the coup leaders were
violating the terms of the Governors Island pact and engineering the killings
of key Aristide supporters, 2 the administration did not move quickly enough
to protest, or to make clear that such abuses would not be tolerated. When the
administration finally resorted to full-scale economic sanctions, many of the
bank accounts frozen contained only nominal sums.' Finally, when the
lightly armed military personnel arrived in Haiti with the quixotic goal of
"retraining" the military, only to be met by Haitian gangs, our government did
not respond with resolve, but simply withdrew, clearly signaling to the junta
and its supporters weak commitment to the Governors Island Accord.
After the failure at Governors Island, the U.S. Special Adviser on Haiti
drafted yet another proposal, which would have required Aristide to appoint
a new Prime Minister acceptable to "centrist" elements; to grant more amnesty
to coup leaders, some (but not all) of whom would then "retire"; and to lift
sanctions before Aristide would return, at an unspecified date. 4 Yet this
proposal, too, violates nearly all of the basic principles sketched above, again
showing how little the United States government has learned from the debacle
thus far. First, by suggesting that Aristide appoint a "centrist" Prime Minister,
the administration violated the nonneutrality principle, effectively acting as a
broker between Aristide's majority supporters (nearly 70% of the Haitian
people) and the minority coup leaders who illegally overthrew the democratic
government. By proposing to lift sanctions before President Aristide returned,
the proposal violated the basic principle of keeping the pressure up. By urging
more amnesty, failing to require departure of all coup leaders, and specifying
no date for Aristide's return, the proposal offended both principles of
accountability and avoiding too little, too late. The plan said and did nothing
to ensure safe haven for refugees, nor did it speak to regional burden-sharing
or otherwise provide for any kind of international mission to protect Aristide
upon his return.
At this writing, our Haiti policy remains in a state of confusion.' The
ironies in the refoulement policy have become painfully manifest. United States
warships currently enforce an economic blockade off the coast of Haiti,
222. See French, supra notes 36, 69 (describing deaths of Antoine Izmery and Minister of Justice Guy
Malary).
223. One U.S. bank account of a Haitian general contained less than five dollars. See Hearing on U.S.
Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Transcript of March 8, 1994 hearing, at 122
(testimony of Michael Barnes, Counsel to President Aristide) ("[The general] is not a fool. They have been
warned for 2 years that their bank accounts might be frozen, so they have put their funds elsewhere.").
224. Bob Herbert, Pretty Words on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, at A21.
225. Under intense criticism-and faced with evidence of mounting human rights abuses in Haiti-the
administration now admits that its policies have failed. It has finally imposed a total embargo and is
considering military force and relaxing the refugee policy. See Douglas Jehl, Clinton's Options on Haiti:
Ever Harsher Choices Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1994, at A10.
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alongside Coast Guard cutters that intercept and return unarmed boat
people. 6 The Clinton administration concedes that the threat of violence
renders it too unsafe for armed American soldiers to land in Port-au-Prince, yet
Coast Guard cutters continue to send unarmed boat people back to the same
Haitian thugs who arrest and punish them upon return. 7 When John
Shattuck, the Clinton administration's top human rights official, returned from
Haiti in mid-December and suggested that a review of our Haitian policy might
be necessary, an anonymous official said that Shattuck's statement, but not our
policy, "was completely wrong and outrageous." 2 8 Most tragic, Haiti
presented a textbook opportunity for the Clinton administration to implement
its foreign policy of promoting democracy and human rights, which the
administration has dealt with by relaxing its pursuit of both objectives.
What lessons does the Haiti Paradigm carry for U.S. human rights policy
in other trouble spots of the world, such as Bosnia, Somalia and China? None
of these illustrate the paradigmatic human rights crisis as clearly as Haiti, but
some of the same basic lessons still apply. In brief, Bosnia illustrates three
problems: neutrality toward human rights abusers; too little, too late; and
failure to impose accountability. Although the Clinton administration
campaigned on a platform of "lift and strike"--lifting the arms embargo and
striking at Serbian positions-upon taking office it did not pursue those
policies for more than a year, standing neutral while massive "ethnic
cleansing" occurred and looking away while countless civilian casualties
mounted. 229
Similarly, in Somalia, the United States fell prey to neutrality in the face
of human rights abuses; too little, too late; failure to keep the pressure up; and
failure to establish accountability. The Carter, Reagan, and Bush
administrations all failed to criticize human rights abuses by the Siad Barre
regime from 1977 to 1989, until the regime's massacres became too blatant to
ignore. When Siad Barre lost control of Mogadishu, President Bush first
opposed U.N. action, then offered air support, and eventually, after losing the
1992 election, moved directly to military intervention. Once they entered the
fray, the U.N. forces became party to human rights abuses themselves, made
no effort to establish forms of accountability, became preoccupied with seeking
vengeance for their own dead, and finally beat an ignominious retreat." °
The Clinton administration's human rights policies in China likewise
reveal that even the most basic lessons have not been learned. Correctly
abandoning the Bush administration's cautious neutrality with regard to human
226. Apple, supra note 37, at Al, A4.
227. Howard W. French, Boat People Face Prosecution, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1993, at A5.
228. Holmes, supra note 208, at A6.
229. See The Abdication, THE NEv REPUBLIC, Feb. 28, 1994, at 7; Carla A. Robbins, Americans'
Inaction on Bosnia Stirs Critics To Debate and Despair, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1994, at Al.
230. HUMAN RIGHTS VATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1994, at 40-45 (1993).
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rights abuses, the Clinton administration issued generally strong Level One and
Two condemnations of human rights abuses in China.231 The administration
condemned human rights abuses in its first annual State Department report,
linked future extension of MFN status to a series of human rights conditions,
met with dissident leaders, and (with some exceptions) kept the pressure up in
the face of Chinese recalcitrance. 232 While Secretary Christopher delivered
the message to a hostile Chinese leadership that China's failure to make
"overall significant progress" by June 1994 would mean the loss of China's
MFN status, numerous critics urged the administration to de-link trade and
human rights.233 At this writing, we are approaching a crucial test. Will the
United States expressly delink trade and human rights in China; skew its Level
One and Two responses by disingenously certifying that China has made
"overall significant progress" in human rights in order to renew MFN status;
or keep the pressure up, signify nonneutrality, and stand by the Level Three
principles outlined above and withdraw trade benefits-gradually or
otherwise-based upon a certified lack of overall significant progress in human
rights?1 4 Whichever option the administration chooses, it has still failed to
adopt a meaningful safe haven policy to protect Chinese boat people fleeing
the abuses it is sanctioning, yet another example of its failure to learn the most
basic lessons of the Haiti Paradigm.
235
V. CONCLUSION
During the campaign, Governor Clinton declared that "United States
foreign policy simply cannot be divorced from the moral principles we believe
in. 236 Most Americans believe that our nation should support elected
democracies, promote human rights, exert moral leadership, and pursue a
humanitarian, yet realistic, policy toward refugees. The Haitian refugee
situation presented the Clinton administration with both a challenge and an
231. Id. at 155-57.
232. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1993, at 604-20 (Feb. 1994) (report submitted to House Comm. on Foreign Affairs & Sen. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.).
233. Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Signals China It May End Annual Trade-Rights Battles, N.Y. TMEs,
Mar. 24, 1994, at Al.
234. I would advocate the third approach. For others making the same policy recommendation, see
Robert L. Bernstein & Richard Dicker, Human Rights First, 94 FOR. POL'Y 43 (1994); Holly Burkhalter,
Squeeze China-By Degrees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, at A23 ("Instead of the 30 to 60 percent tariff
increase that is believed to be inevitable, the Administration could hike tariffs by, say, 10 percent at the
outset, with further increases if Beijing kept dragging its feet on human rights.").
235. See Grover J. Rees, Boat People Deserve Better, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at A15 (suggesting
international resettlement as the solution for both Haitian and Chinese boat people). The administration's
actions have already triggered a transnational public lawsuit. See Yang v. Maugans, No. 94-7060 (3d Cir.
argued Mar. 24, 1994) (appeal of dismissal of class action on behalf of Golden Venture refugees).
236. Governor Bill Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security (Dec. 12, 1991) (address at
Georgetown University) (transcript reprinted in Fed. News Serv., available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File).
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opportunity: the challenge of succeeding where its predecessor had failed and
the opportunity to do so in a way that would signal a return to-not a rejection
of-our most fundamental American values. Thus far, the administration has
neither met the challenge nor grasped the opportunity.
The Haitian crisis of the early 1990's revealed the possibilities and limits
of transnational public law litigation, the continuing dysfunction in our foreign
policy decisionmaking structure, and recurrent defects in the making of United
States human rights policy. However the current Haitian situation is eventually
resolved, the crisis should be remembered as a paradigmatic case study in both
human rights policymaking and transnational legal process: a test of whether
and how international law really matters in the conduct of global affairs.
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